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Towards a Regulatory Design for Reducing Emissions from Agriculture: Lessons 






The land sector is essential to achieve the Paris Agreement goals. Agriculture and land 
use contribute to between 20 and 25 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions. The 
Paris Agreement’s aim to keep the average global temperature rise between 1.5 and 2 
degrees Celsius implies that drastic emission cuts from agriculture are needed. The 
sequestration potential of agriculture and land use offers an important mechanism to 
achieve a transition to net-zero carbon emissions worldwide. So far, however, states 
have been reluctant to address emissions from, and sequestration by, the agricultural 
sector. Some states that have or are setting up a domestic emission-trading scheme 
allow for the generation of offsets in agriculture, but only to a limited extent. Australia 
is the only country that has a fairly broad set of methodologies in place to award credits 
to farmers for all kinds of carbon-farming projects. This article reviews the experience 
with the Australian model so far, with the objective of articulating transferable lessons 
for regulatory design aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture. It 
finds that it is possible to regulate for the reduction of emissions from agriculture and 
for increased sequestration in agricultural soils and in vegetation on agricultural lands, 
provided that certain conditions are met. Regulation must focus on individual projects at 
farms, based on a long-term policy that has a wider focus than just emission reduction. 
Such projects must comply with climate-smart methodologies that ensure the delivery 
of real, additional, measurable, and verifiable emission reductions and also foster long-
term innovation and create economic, social, and environmental co-benefits. Moreover, 




Paris Agreement; climate-smart agriculture; carbon farming; carbon offsets; emissions 
from agriculture; soil carbon; carbon sequestration; emission trading. 
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Under the Paris Agreement, in order to hold the increase in the global average 
temperature well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, a balance needs to 
be achieved between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of 
greenhouse gases in the second half of this century.1 Although the Paris Agreement 
hardly mentions agriculture, both agriculture and land use are sectors that are important 
for the achievement of this goal.2 Following decades of neglect, the international 
community is slowly starting to acknowledge this fact. A May 2016 UNFCCC 
Secretariat survey of states’ INDCs shows that 74 per cent of the 138 INDCs submitted 
cover agriculture.3 However, policies are generally lacking and need to be developed 
from scratch. 
 
In its Fifth Assessment Report, the IPCC’s Working Group III concludes that the 
AFOLU sector (agriculture, forestry, and other land use) is responsible for just under a 
quarter (~10-12 GtCO2 eq./yr) of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
4 Usually, a 
distinction is made between non-CO2 emissions, in particular methane emitted by 
livestock and from rice cultivation, and nitrous oxide from the use of synthetic 
fertilizers and the application of manure on soils and pasture. The global warming 
potentials of methane and nitrous oxide are, respectively, 25 times and 300 times that of 
CO2. CO2 emissions from agriculture are mainly caused by deforestation and peatland 
drainage. Emissions from agriculture have been rising on a yearly basis since 1990, 
although with important regional differences (they went down in Europe and up in 
Asia).5 So far, these emissions have not been specifically addressed under the 
UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, or the Paris Agreement.6 Domestic regulators have also 
been reluctant to address agricultural emissions.7 
 
It is expected that under a business-as-usual scenario, emissions from agriculture will 
rise sharply over the coming years and decades because of an expected increase of 40 
per cent or more in the demand for agricultural products, mainly in Asia.8 The causes of 
 
1 Paris Agreement, art. 4.  
2 Joeri Rogelj, Michel den Elzen, Niklas Höhne, Taryn Fransen, Hanna Fekete, Harald Winkler, Roberto 
Schaeffer, Fu Sha, Keywan Riahi, and Malte Meinshausen, ‘Paris Agreement Climate Proposals Need a 
Boost to Keep Warming Well Below 2 °C, 534 Nature 631 (2016). See also Jonathan Verschuuren, ‘The 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Agriculture and Food Security’, 7(1) European Journal of Risk 
Regulation 54-57 (2016). 
3 UNFCCC Secretariat, ‘Aggregate Effect of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions: An 
Update. Synthesis report by the secretariat’, FCCC/CP/2016/2 (2016) at 32. 
4 P. Smith et al., ‘Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU)’ in Climate Change 2014: 
Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 
816. 
5 Ibid., at 823. 
6 Verschuuren, supra note 2; Jonathan Verschuuren, ‘Climate Change and Agriculture under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Related Documents’, in Research Handbook on 
Climate and Agricultural Law, edited by Mary Jane Angelo and Anel DuPlessis (Chelthenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar, 2016). 
7 The IPCC points at ‘implementation challenges, including institutional barriers and inertia related to 
governance issues’, Smith et al., supra note 4, at 817. 
8 Bruce Campbell, Wendy Mann, Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz, Charlotte Streck and Timm Tennigkeit, 
Agriculture and Climate Change: A Scoping Report (Washington, DC: Meridian Institute, 2011) at 3. 
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the rise in demand include the growing world population (from seven billion today to 
nine billion in 2050) and dietary changes caused by a wealthier middle class in 
countries such as China and India. In Australia, the agrifood sector expects to be able to 
increase its production by 77 per cent from 2007 levels by 2050 to meet this greater 
Asian demand.9 
 
To address the expected rise in emissions from agriculture, many developed countries 
are in the process of integrating the land use sector into their climate policies. The EU, 
for example, will require the agricultural and land use sectors to fully contribute to 
achieving the EU's 2030 emission reduction target.10 As explained below, the only 
country that already has a discrete regulatory instrument in place to reduce emissions 
from agriculture is Australia. Its ‘Carbon Farming Initiative’ (CFI) is now five years’ 
old. Despite the country’s much criticized poor overall climate policy, the CFI did spur 
farmers into action and, therefore, potentially provides the rest of the world with a 
model to reduce emissions from agriculture. This article reviews the experiences with 
this model so far, with the objective to articulate transferable lessons for regulatory 
design aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture.  
 
This article builds partly on desk research and partly on empirical research into 
stakeholders’ experiences with the Australian scheme. First, a study of the relevant legal 
and policy documents was conducted, to find out the regulatory design of the Australian 
instrument, and its broader legal and policy background. Then, relevant stakeholders 
were interviewed, and case studies into selected projects were carried out, to discover 
the experiences of these stakeholders with the scheme, as well as the pros and cons of 
the regulatory approach. Stakeholders interviewed included the government authorities 
involved, such as the main regulator and administrator of the CFI, agricultural business 
organizations, consultants working with individual farmers (‘carbon agents’), and 
financial institutions that finance farming businesses.11 It should be noted that the article 
only focuses on the impact of the CFI on farming. It does not assess the impact of this 
instrument on other sectors, nor does it assess the broader Australian emissions 
reduction framework. 
 
The article has been structured as follows. Section 2 gives a short introduction into 
current regulatory approaches to reducing emissions from agriculture, mapping the 
various examples across the world, as well as into the wider context of climate-smart 
agriculture. Section 3 gives a detailed description of current Australian legislation on 
reducing emissions from agriculture, as well as the science background of the CFI. 
Section 4 reports on the findings of the empirical research. Section 5 draws lessons from 
the Australian model.  
 
2. Regulating Emissions from Agriculture Around the World 
 
 
9 Climate Change Authority, Reducing Australia’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Targets and Progress 
Review—Final Report (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2014) at 305. 
10 European Council, ‘2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework’, EUCO 169/14 (2014), at 5. 
11 The methodology of the empirical research is explained in more detail in section 4.1 below. 
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The most common policy instrument used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is 
emission trading.12 Emission-trading schemes exist in a large number of countries, 
states, provinces, and cities,13 including the 28 EU member states and three associated 
states (EU ETS),14 Switzerland (linkage with EU ETS is under discussion),15 nine states 
in the northeastern United States (RGGI),16 California,17 the Canadian provinces of 
Quebec (linked to the California ETS),18 Ontario (aimed to be linked with the California 
ETS and Quebec ETS),19 and Alberta,20 seven regions in China (aiming to scale up to 
the national level in 2017),21 South Korea,22 Kazakhstan,23 New Zealand,24 and the 
Japanese cities of Saitama and Tokyo.25 Australia set up a national ETS in 2012; it was 
 
12 Harro Van Asselt, Michael Mehling and Clarisse Siebert, ‘The Changing Architecture of International 
Climate Change Law’, in Research Handbook on Climate Change Mitigation Law edited by Geert van 
Calster, Wim. Vandenberghe, and Leonie Reins (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2015) at 20. 
13 For information on all of these emissions trading schemes, see the case study reports: Institute for 
Climate Economics, Put a price on carbon: different models of carbon pricing around the world (Paris: 
I4CE, 2015), <www.i4ce.org/go_project/put-a-price-on-carbon-different-models-of-carbon-pricing-
around-the-world/> (last accessed on 29 August 2016). 
14 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading, OJ L 275/32 (2003).  
15 Federal Act of 23 December 2011 on the Reduction of CO2 Emissions (CO2 Act), see 
<https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20091310/index.html> (last accessed on 29 August 
2016). In January 2016, Switzerland and the EU reached an agreement on linkage of the Swiss and the 
EU ETS, see Environment Ministry press statement 
<www.bafu.admin.ch/dokumentation/medieninformation/00962/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=60425> 
(last accessed on 29 August 2016). 
16 This ETS is based upon regulations in each of the participating states. See the RGGI’s website 
<www.rggi.org/design/regulations> (last accessed on 29 August 2016). 
17 Regulation for the California Cap on Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Market-Based Compliance 
Mechanisms, title 17, CCR, sections 95801-96022, 
<www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade/unofficial_ct_030116.pdf> (last accessed on 29 August 
2016). 
18 The Québec Cap and Trade System for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowances, see 
<www.mddelcc.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/documentation-en.htm#regulations> (last accessed on 
29 August 2016). 
19 The Climate Change Mitigation and Low Carbon Economy Act was adopted on 18 May 2016 and the 
Cap and Trade Regulation took effect on 1 July 2016, see <https://www.ontario.ca/page/cap-and-trade> 
(last accessed on 29 August 2016). 
20 Specified Gas Emissions Regulation, Alberta Regulation 139/2007, see <http://aep.alberta.ca/climate-
change/guidelines-legislation/specified-gas-emitters-regulation/default.aspx> (last accessed on 29 August 
2016).  
21 See in much detail Huizhen Chen, Towards a Market-Based Climate Policy in China? A Legal 
Perspective on the Design and Application of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading (doctoral thesis 
University of Maastricht, 2015), and Jiang Xiaoyi, ‘Climate change and energy law’ in Research 
Handbook on Chinese Environmental Law edited by Qin Tianbao (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2015) 162-
95. 
22 Act on Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowances (2012). Trading under the 
ETS started in 2015. See <http://eng.me.go.kr/eng/web/index.do?menuId=450&findDepth=1> (last 
accessed on 29 August 2016).  
23 Based on amendments to the Kazakhstan Ecological Code (2011), and largely modelled on the EU 
ETS. See <http://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/K070000212_> (last accessed on 29 August 2016). 
24 Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Act 2008, Act 2008 No. 85, see 
<http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2008/0085/latest/DLM1130932.html> (last accessed on 29 
August 2016).  
25 Marion Afriat, Katherine Rittenhouse and Katie Kouchakji, ‘Tokyo: A Case Study on Emissions 
Trading’, in Institute for Climate Economics, supra note 13. 
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repealed in 2015, before trading commenced.26 (Australia’s CFI remained in place as a 
stand-alone instrument following the repeal of the ETS.) 
 
None of these schemes directly apply to emissions from agriculture, although some 
allow offsets from agriculture as will be explained below. In New Zealand, it was 
initially planned to require farmers to surrender allowances under the ETS, but this plan 
was dropped in 2012 following a successful lobby by the agriculture sector.27 The 
inclusion of farming in an ETS is considered problematic because of the difficulty of 
measuring emissions and emission reductions at the farm level. Non-CO2 emissions 
from livestock and the use of fertilizers can be fairly easily estimated at the national 
level28 using uniform emission factors (per animal, per unit of arable land, etc.).29 This 
is why non-CO2 emissions from agriculture are assessed and regulated at a generic, 
sector-wide level, following the IPCC’s instructions for calculating emissions from 
agriculture.30 At the individual farm level, actual emissions are much more difficult to 
measure because of the variety of factors involved (such as the diet of individual 
animals, tillage intensity, soil composition, weather systems of individual regions, the 
way in which fertilizer is applied, etc.).31 Even more difficult to estimate are 
agriculture’s CO2 emissions, as CO2 removals must also be accounted for. The use of 
uniform emission criteria to overcome the measurement problems at individual farms 
has the disadvantage that it diminishes the incentive of individual farmers to change 
their practices; it is also more vulnerable to fraud because of the disconnect with real 
life emissions.32 A farm-specific monitoring and measurement system is expensive and 
 
26 Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 as amended in 2014. See Climate Change 
Authority, supra note 9, at 77-83. 
27 David Bullock, ‘Emissions Trading in New Zealand: Development, Challenges and Design’, 21(4) 
Environmental Politics 657 (2012) at 661. Under the Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading and 
Other Matters) Amendment Act 2012, the obligation to surrender allowances for agricultural emissions 
was suspended. What remained is the requirement for farmers in some sectors (meat processors, dairy 
processors, nitrogen fertilizer manufacturers and importers, and live animal exporters) to report biological 
emissions from methane and nitrous oxide that are produced on-farm. See 
<http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/ets-amendments/> (last accessed on 29 
August 2016).  
28 Peter Wehrheim and Asger Strange Oleson, ‘Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry – How to Enter 
the Climate Impact of Managing Biospheres and Wood into the EU’s Greenhouse Accounting’ in 
Research Handbook on Climate Change Mitigation Law edited by Geert van Calster, Wim. 
Vandenberghe, and Leonie Reins (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2015) at 304. 
29 Andrew Macintosh and Lauren Waugh, ‘An Introduction to the Carbon Farming Initiative: Key 
Principles and Concepts’, 29(6) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 439 (2012) at 445-6. 
30 IPCC, Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (see especially the 
chapter on agriculture in Volume 2, <http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gl/invs5c.html> (last 
accessed on 29 August 2016)). See in more detail Verschuuren, supra note 6 at 31-34. In the EU, 
emissions from agriculture have been included in the Effort Sharing Decision (Decision 406/2009/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the Effort of Member States to Reduce 
their Greenhouse Gas Emissions to Meet the Community’s Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction 
Commitments up to 2020, OJ L 140/136 (2009)), which means that agricultural emissions, together with 
emissions from other non-ETS sectors, are subject to an overall reduction target for each member state. 
Individual Member States are free to choose how and where they are achieving this overall target, see 
Wehrheim and Oleson, supra note 26, at 313. 
31 Hugh Saddler and Helen King, ‘Agriculture and Emissions Trading: The Impossible Dream?’ 
(Discussion Paper Series No. 102, The Australia Institute, 2008), at 102. 
32 Macintosh and Waugh, supra note 29. 
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involves a large number of actors.33 Australia, for one, has more than 123,000 
agricultural businesses.34 Measuring their greenhouse gas emissions and carbon 
sequestration individually could be an administrative nightmare. 
 
Under some of the emission-trading schemes mentioned above, credits can be generated 
from agriculture to be used as offsets by industries required to submit emission 
allowances. This is the case in California, Quebec, Alberta, Ontario, and under the 
RGGI; and it was the case in the Australian scheme. Under California’s ETS, two types 
of agricultural offset project are accepted, each aimed at reducing methane emissions: 
biogas systems in dairy cattle and swine farms,35 and rice-cultivation projects.36 Alberta 
accepts a wide range of agricultural offset projects: nitrous-oxide emission reductions, 
biofuel production and usage, waste biomass projects, several renewable-energy 
production and usage projects, conservation cropping, several types of project involving 
beef production (low residual feed intake, reduced age at harvest, reduced days on 
feed), projects aimed at reducing emissions from dairy cattle, and biogas production.37 
 
In some countries, agricultural offsets are linked to other regulatory instruments aimed 
at reducing GHG emissions. Japan has an elaborate offset credit system (J-VER), linked 
to various, mostly voluntary, programmes for industry and the energy sector.38 The 
scheme allows individuals, businesses, and local governments to invest in offset 
projects, with the aim not only to reduce emissions but also to expand job opportunities, 
support domestic project proponents, and vitalize local industries.39 Project registration 
and credit issuance requires verification by accredited bodies under the ISO14065 
accreditation programme. Four agricultural methodologies were adopted under this 
system: mitigation of nitrous-oxide emissions from tea-land soil by application of 
chemical fertilizers containing a nitrification inhibitor; mitigation of methane emissions 
from flooded rice paddies by application of composts instead of rice straws; reduction in 
emissions from livestock excrement management through changed management 
methods; and reduction in emissions from the disposal of pig excreta through 
replacement of conventional feed with low-protein formula feed.40 Under South 
 
33 Ibid. 
34 Australian Bureau of Statistics, data for 2015, see 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/4627.0> (last accessed on 29 August 2016).  
35 The methodology for the implementation of these systems has been laid down in the Compliance Offset 
Protocol Livestock Projects. Capturing and Destroying Methane from Manure Management Systems, 
adopted by the California EPA’s Air Resources Board on 14 November 2014, 
<http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2014/capandtrade14/ctlivestockprotocol.pdf> (last accessed on 29 August 
2016).  
36 See Compliance Offset Protocol Rice Cultivation Projects, adopted 25 June 2015, 
<http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/protocols/rice/riceprotocol2015.pdf> (last accessed on 29 August 
2016).  
37 For more information, see the Alberta Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry’s website, 
<http://www1.agric.gov.ab.ca/$Department/deptdocs.nsf/all/cl11618> (last accessed on 29 August 2016).  
38 Marion Afriat, Katherine Rittenhouse and Katie Kouchakji, ‘Japan: A Case Study on Carbon Pricing’ 
in Institute for Climate Economics, supra note 13. 
39 See the government website on the offset credit scheme <http://www.j-ver.go.jp/e/about_jver.html> 
(last accessed on 29 August 2016).  
40 Ibid.  
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Africa’s draft Carbon Tax Bill,41 the agricultural sector will be exempt from carbon 
taxes, at least until 2020.42 Instead, liable entities will be able to generate offsets in the 
agricultural sector. Eligible offset projects aim to restore subtropical thickets, forests, 
and woodlands, restore and manage grasslands, and support small-scale afforestation, 
biomass-energy production, anaerobic biogas digesters, and reduced tillage.43 
 
As a final introductory remark, it should be noted that the carbon-farming initiatives 
mentioned above are primarily aimed at mitigation of GHG emissions. They are not 
aimed at improving the resilience of the agricultural sector to the impacts of climate 
change. As such, carbon farming has a narrower scope than climate-smart agriculture 
(CSA). CSA is an approach to developing the technical, policy, and investment 
conditions to achieve sustainable agricultural development for food security under 
climate change, and is composed of three main pillars: sustainably increasing 
agricultural productivity and incomes; adapting and building resilience to climate 
change; and reducing or removing greenhouse gas emissions.44 Carbon-farming 
initiatives, given their focus on GHG emission cuts from agriculture and increased 
carbon sequestration in agricultural soils and vegetation, are important elements of a 
regulatory regime on CSA, but must be complemented by instruments aimed at 
adaptation and food security. In practice, increased resilience is often a side-effect of 
carbon-offset projects in agriculture, particularly of those projects aimed at increased 
carbon sequestration in soils and planting vegetation on agricultural lands, as these lead 
to more fertile soils and better moisture retention and thus to increased production, 
better water management, and reduced fertilizer use. A recent literature review found 
that increasing soil carbon can have profound effects on soil quality and agro-ecosystem 
productivity. Soil carbon plays an important role in maintaining soil structure, 
improving soil-water retention, fostering healthy soil microbial communities, and 
providing fertility for crops.45 Also, soil-carbon projects are often part of the 
introduction of wider regenerative practices that focus on soils, water, and 
biodiversity.46 That is why in my research for this article, attention was paid to potential 
 
41 The Draft Carbon Tax Bill was published in November 2015, see <http://www.treasury.gov.za/public 
comments/CarbonTaxBill2015/Carbon Tax Bill final for release for comment.pdf> (last accessed on 29 
August 2016). The new system of carbon taxes is expected to take effect as of January 2017. Draft 
Carbon Offset Regulations were published on 20 June 2016, see <http://www.treasury.gov.za/public 
comments/CarbonTaxBill2016/Carbon offset Regulations.pdf> (last accessed on 29 August 2016). 
42 Michael Kidd, ‘Climate Change and Agriculture’ in Climate Change Law and Governance in South 
Africa, edited by Tracy-Lynn Humby, Louis Kotzé, Olivia Rumble, and Andrew Gilder (Cape Town: 
Juta, 2016), at ch. 17, p. 10.  
43 Olivia Rumble, Andrew Gilder, and Mansoor Parker, ‘Carbon Pricing in South Africa’ in Climate 
Change Law and Governance in South Africa, edited by Tracy-Lynn Humby, Louis Kotzé, Olivia 
Rumble, and Andrew Gilder (Cape Town: Juta, 2016), at ch. 20, p. 35. 
44 FAO, Climate Smart Agriculture Sourcebook (Rome: FAO, 2013) at ix. 
45 Daniel Kane, Carbon Sequestration Potential on Agricultural Lands: A Review of Current Science and 
Available Practices (Washington, DC: National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition, 2015) at 18. See also, 
among many others, Rattan Lal, ‘Societal Value of Soil Carbon’, 69(6) Journal of Soil and Water 
Conservation 186A (2014); F. Alliaume, W.A.H. Rossing, M. García, K.E. Giller, and S. Dogliotti, 
‘Changes in Soil Quality and Plant Available Water Capacity Following Systems Re-design on 
Commercial Vegetable Farms’, 46 European Journal of Agronomy 10 (2013). 
46 In Australia, for example, there is growing support for such programmes as ‘soils for life’ and ‘healthy 
soils’. Case studies show remarkable results of reduced carbon emissions, better growing conditions, 
more water availability, and more biodiversity, see <http://www.soilsforlife.org.au> and 
<http://www.healthysoils.com.au> (last accessed on 29 August 2016).  
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co-benefits of Australian carbon farming projects for adaptation and food security, as 
shown below. 
 
3. Australia’s Carbon Farming Initiative 
 
This section gives a detailed description of current Australian legislation on reducing 
emissions from agriculture (3.2). First, I will give a brief sketch of the science 
background to the legislation. 
 
3.1. Science Background to the CFI 
 
3.1.1. Australia’s GHG Emissions 
 
Australia is a high-emitting country in terms of both total and per-capita emissions.47 In 
2015, Australia’s emissions, including LULUCF, totaled 535.7 Mt CO2 eq. (529.2 Mt 
CO2 eq. excluding LULUCF),
48 2.5 per cent below 2000 levels.49 Australia has the 
highest emissions per capita of all developed countries.50 On average, Australians emit 
17.3 t CO2 eq. per person, compared to 6.7 t CO2 eq. in the EU.
51 In Australia, per 
capita emissions went up 7 per cent between 1990 and 2014.52 By comparison, in the 
United States and the EU they went down 16 and 27 per cent, respectively, over the 
same period.53 Australia is responsible for about 1.3 per cent of the world’s GHG 
emissions, making it the fifteenth highest emitter in the world.54 The Climate Change 
Performance Index, which rates the climate-protection performance of 58 countries, 
which together are responsible for more than 90 per cent of global energy-related CO2 
emissions, has Australia in the category of ‘very poor’. Indeed, Australia is near the 
bottom of the list; only Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia perform worse.55 
 
Most publications on Australia’s climate change policies begin by referring to the 
dominance of coal in Australia as an explanation of why climate change policy and 
regulation in Australia remains underdeveloped.56 Mining contributes about 8 per cent 
 
47 Climate Change Authority, supra note 9, at 69. 
48 Department of the Environment, Quarterly Update of Australia’s National Greenhouse Gas Inventory: 
December 2015 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2016) at 7. 
49 Ibid. at 34. 
50 Ibid. at 69. 
51 Jos G. J. Olivier, Greet Janssens-Maenhout, Marilena Muntean and Jeroen A.H.W. Peters, Trends in 
Global CO2 Emissions: 2015 Report (The Hague: Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 




54 Climate Change Authority, supra note 9, at 69. 
55 Jan Burck, Franziska Marten and Christoph Bals, The Climate Change Performance Index. Results 
2016 (Bonn: Germanwatch & Climate Action Network, 2016) at 9. 
56 For example, Hari M. Osofsky and Jacqueline Peel, ‘The Role of Litigation in Multilevel Climate 
Change Governance: Possibilities for a Lower Carbon Future?’ 30(4) Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal 303-28 (2013) at 312-13, as well as Climate Change Authority, supra note 9, at 69. 
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to GDP.57 Australia is the fourth largest coal producer (after China, the United States, 
and India).58 Australia, which has vast coal reserves,59 was the world’s largest coal 
exporter until 2011, when it was overtaken by Indonesia.60 The fact that Australia’s 
economic growth has stayed above the OECD average is attributed largely to a booming 
mining sector.61 Domestic energy supply is generated mainly by coal (at 74 per cent, it 
is well above the OECD average of 20 per cent) and natural gas (12 per cent).62 
Renewables account for 14 per cent of domestic energy production.63 
 
3.1.2. Emissions from Agriculture 
 
Agriculture contributes about 4 per cent to Australia’s GDP.64 Excluding emissions 
from LULUCF, agriculture accounted for 13 per cent of Australia’s emissions in 
2015.65 Three-quarters of this is caused by livestock keeping (mostly from enteric 
fermentation). The remaining one quarter is evenly shared between cropping and 
savanna burning.66 Emissions fluctuate with droughts, when livestock populations go 
down, followed by decreasing emissions.67 On average, however, emissions from 
agriculture have been fairly stable and are expected to grow through to 2030.68  
Although there is a steady progress in reducing emissions per tonne of livestock 
produce partly as a result of the pricing mechanism introduced through the CFI, 
discussed below, the substantial increase in the livestock population causes overall 
emissions to go up. 69 Because Australia is in a good position to meet the increasing 
demand for agrifood commodities in emerging economies in Asia, its production of 
agrifood may increase by as much as 77 per cent from 2007 levels by 2050.70 The 
expected production growth is likely to offset emission reductions achieved through the 
introduction of climate-smart agriculture practices and technologies.71 
 
3.2. Current Regulatory Framework for Emission Reductions from Agriculture 
 
3.2.1. Introduction: Rise and Fall of Emission Trading in Australia 
 
 
57 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia (2012) at 1301.0, 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/1301.0~2012~Main%20Features~Mini
ng%20Industry~150> (last accessed on 29 August 2016).  
58 World Energy Council, World Energy Resources: Coal (London: World Energy Council, 2013) at 1.3. 
59 Ibid. at 1.14-15. 
60 Ibid. at 1.6. 
61 Peter Downes, Kevin Hanslow and Peter Tulip, ‘The Effect of the Mining Boom on the Australian 
Economy’ (Research Discussion Paper No. 2014-08, Reserve Bank of Australia, 2014). 
62 Australian Energy Regulator, State of the Energy Market 2014 (Melbourne: Australian Energy 
Regulator, 2014) at 25 and 27 respectively. 
63 Ibid. at 27. 
64 Australian Bureau of Statistics, supra note 34. 
65 Department of the Environment, supra note 48, at 14-15. 
66 Climate Change Authority, supra note 9, at 300. Note that emissions from savanna burning are reported 
under LULUCF rather than under agriculture, see Department of the Environment, supra note 48, at 14. 
67 Ibid. at 301. 
68 Ibid. at 301-302. Beef cattle is expected to grow by 28 per cent between 2008 and 2030, sheep by 14 
per cent and poultry by 16 per cent. 
69 Ibid. 




In 2011, an Australian emission-trading scheme, following the EU’s example, was set 
up by the federal Clean Energy Act 2011; it took effect on 1 July 2012.72 The scheme 
included the energy sector, major industrial activities, mining, domestic shipping, 
domestic aviation, rail transport and non-transport use of fuels, waste (accepted by 
landfills after 1 July 2012), and fugitive emissions. It covered roughly 50 per cent of 
Australia’s emissions. A fixed price was set for the first three years: AU$23 (US$17) 
per tonne CO2 eq. for the first year, increasing by 2.5 per cent in each of the two 
subsequent years.73 Trading was to commence on 1 July 2015, on which date the 
Australian ETS was to be linked to the EU ETS. A price cap and a price floor were set 
for the first three trading years (until 2018).74 The scheme’s cap on emissions was set to 
achieve a modest 5 per cent reduction below 2000 levels by 2020, in line with 
Australia’s pledge under the UNFCCC. The independent Climate Change Authority 
was created to oversee the system and to advise the government on the functioning of 
the ETS. 
 
Emissions from agriculture, forestry, land use, and landfills (waste accepted before 1 
July 2012) were not included in the ETS. There were several reasons for this, including 
that (1) agricultural, forestry, and land-use sources and sinks are diffuse and involve a 
large number of actors, which would lead to a sharp increase in the number of liable 
entities and administration costs; (2) as indicated above, emissions and sequestration are 
difficult and expensive to monitor and measure; reverting to simplified estimation 
methodologies bears the risk of reducing incentives to reduce emissions or becoming 
sensitive to fraud; and (3), most importantly, there was strong political opposition, with 
the agriculture and forestry sectors in Australia having considerable political 
influence.75 
 
A separate system, linked to the ETS, was designed for these activities. It was 
implemented through the Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (CFI 
Act).76 The Act allowed for emission offset projects to be proposed, which, once 
accepted, would lead to the issuance of Australian Carbon Credit Units (ACCUs) for 
each tonne of CO2 eq. emissions abated or sequestered. ACCUs could be purchased by 
firms in sectors included in the ETS to meet their obligations. In the fixed-price period 
(2012-2015), entities regulated under the ETS could rely on CFI credits for only 5 per 
cent of their emissions; following 2015, there would be no such limitation. Some of the 
credits were also recognized under the Kyoto Protocol, and could, therefore, also be 
 
72 Clean Energy Act 2011, No. 131 (2011). See Elena de Lemos Pinto Aydos, ‘Australia’s Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism’ in Carbon Pricing, Growth and the Environment edited by Larry Kleiser, Ana Yábar 
Sterling, Pedro Herrera, Janet E. Milne and Hope Ashiabor (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012) at 261. 
73 At that time (1 July 2012) around €19, significantly above the EU’s carbon price of €5 in 2012. 
74 Emma French, ‘“Greenbacks” versus Green Credits: has the Carbon Farming Initiative Got the Balance 
Right?’ 30(5) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 434 (2013) at 449. 
75 Macintosh and Waugh, supra note 29. See also section 2 above. 
76 Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011, No. 101 (2011). See Celeste M. Black, ‘Linking 
Land Sector Activities to Emissions Trading: Australia’s Carbon Farming Initiative’ in Carbon Pricing, 
Growth and the Environment edited by Larry Kleiser, Ana Yábar Sterling, Pedro Herrera, Janet E. Milne 
and Hope Ashiabor (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012) at 185; Andrew Macintosh, ‘The Carbon Farming 
Initiative: Removing the Obstacles to its Success’ 4(2) Carbon Management 185 (2013); Macintosh and 
Waugh, supra note 29. 
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sold on the international carbon market. In addition, the government allocated funds to 
buy up non-Kyoto credits generated under the CFI Act. 
 
The Clean Energy Act was repealed just two years after its entry into force, following a 
change in government. The emission-pricing mechanism was replaced by an Emissions 
Reduction Fund (ERF, or Direct Action Plan), which took effect in April 2015. Under 
the ERF, the government purchases emission reductions offered by businesses, local 
governments, or others, through reverse auctions or other means. The CFI Act was used 
as a statutory vehicle to introduce the ERF’s provisions.77 The new scheme for energy, 
industry, and transport essentially applies the CFI system that was originally designed 
for agriculture, forestry, and landfills. Instead of a market-based system, the government 
buys up ACCUs generated through emission-reduction projects. A total budget of 
AU$2.55 billion (US$1.95 billion) has been allocated to purchase emission reductions 
between 2015 and 2019. All CFI projects pre-existing the reform automatically 
transitioned to the amended Act. CFI methodologies remained largely unchanged. 
ACCUs can also be sold in the private market as voluntary offsets. The Clean Energy 
Regulator (CER) is the government agency that administers the implementation of the 
scheme (auctions, registrations, compliance, etc.). The CFI Act is a very complex piece 
of legislation with hundreds of provisions, taking up more than three hundred pages of 
text, plus an additional seventy-nine pages of detailed provisions in the Carbon Credits 
(Carbon Farming Initiative) Rule 2015 (CFI Rule).78 
 




ACCUs can be obtained for both emission-avoidance projects and sequestration 
projects. Agricultural emission-avoidance projects mostly focus on methane emission 
reductions: methane capture and combustion from livestock manure and methane 
emission reduction through manipulation of digestive processes of livestock. Another 
important emission-avoidance project for the agricultural sector is the application of 
urease or nitrification inhibitors aimed at reducing fertilizer and manure emissions. The 
sequestration projects covered are not specifically listed but are broadly defined.79 
Projects aimed at increased sequestration of carbon in soils are important examples of 
agricultural projects under this category. Most other sequestration projects are in the 
category of vegetation, which includes forestry (reforestation, improved forest 
management, reduced forest degradation, etc.). Although technically not agricultural 
projects, the latter type of project can be, and indeed is also very relevant for farmers, as 
it includes on-farm revegetation, rangeland or wetland restoration, the application of 
biochar to soil, and the establishment of permanent plantings. 
 
 
77 Carbon Farming Initiative Amendment Act 2014, No. 119 (2014). 
78 Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Rule 2015 of 13 February 2015. 
79 Projects that remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere by sequestering carbon in living biomass, 
dead organic matter or soil, and/or projects that avoid emissions of greenhouse gasses from these three 
sources, S. 54. 
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Projects that result in the clearing of native forest are not allowed. Projects must 
generate 2,000 t CO2 eq. a year on average.
80 Smaller projects, therefore, must seek 
collaboration and form aggregated projects.81 Projects can be Kyoto or non-Kyoto 
projects or both (in the latter case, applicants can separate out eligible offsets from non-
eligible ones).82 
 
3.2.2.2. Methodology Determinations 
 
Projects are only eligible when covered by an approved methodology. Depending on the 
methodology, all kinds of conditions must be met to ensure that emission reductions are 
real and additional. Conditions are also set on reporting and auditing. An Emissions 
Reduction Assurance Committee (ERAC) has been set up to check whether certain 
integrity standards are applied.83 According to these standards, abatement: 
 
 is permanent and additional to business as usual (‘additionality test’) 
 is measurable and verifiable 
 takes into account possible leakage (which must be deducted from the abatement) 
 meets internationally recognized accounting standards 
 is supported by relevant (peer reviewed) science 
 accounts for cyclical variability.84 
 
A proponent of a project may apply for approval of a methodology, or the ERAC may 
approve a methodology of its own accord. A methodology can be project-specific, but 
ideally it should be applicable to future similar projects. A methodology sets the rules 
on how to calculate emission reductions in the project, how to determine the baseline, 
and how to report, keep records, and monitor. Once endorsed by the ERAC, the relevant 
minister in the federal government confirms the methodology. 
 
Methodologies are regularly updated. For the agricultural sector, the following 
methodologies had been established as of June 2016:85 
 
 Beef cattle herd management 
 Destruction of methane from piggeries using engineered biodigesters 
 Destruction of methane generated from dairy manure in covered anaerobic ponds 
 Destruction of methane generated from manure in piggeries 
 Estimating sequestration of carbon in soil using default values 
 Fertilizer use efficiency in irrigated cotton 
 
80 S. 66 CFI Rule. 
81 The Emissions Reduction Fund White Paper suggests that this minimum can be changed later, 
Australian Government, ‘Emissions Reduction Fund White Paper’ (Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2014) at 45. 
82 S. 11 CFI Act. 
83 S. 254 CFI Act; formerly known as Domestic Offsets Integrity Committee. 
84 S. 133 CFI Act. 
85 Several other methodology determinations had been revoked in 2015 following the start of the ERF, 
while others were amended. For an up-to-date overview of all methods, see 
<https://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/emissions-reduction-fund/methods> (last accessed on 
29 August 2016).  
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 Reducing greenhouse gas emissions in beef cattle through feeding nitrate 
containing supplements 
 Reducing greenhouse gas emissions in milking cows through feeding dietary 
additives 
 Sequestering carbon in soils in grazing systems. 
 
To get a sense of the requirements imposed on participating farmers in these 
methodologies, I will consider two examples, one emission-avoidance method and one 
sequestration method. 
 
Projects aimed at methane destruction in piggeries encompass installation and use of 
engineered biodigesters to treat manure, receiving the manure in the biodigesters 
(instead of an uncovered anaerobic lagoon) to undergo anaerobic decomposition, and 
installation of a flaring system that monitors performance.86 Under this project type, it is 
also permitted to add additional waste to the biodigester, under strict conditions 
(limiting both the type and amount of waste added to the manure). The methodology 
lays down a wide range of detailed rules and conditions. It includes data-collection 
requirements, e.g. the quantity of biogas sent to a combustion device. Project owners are 
obliged to use a prescribed model to help them estimate the net abatement amount.87 
There are rules on how to calculate the baseline, the emissions associated with the 
project (e.g. emissions caused from additional energy use, which must be deducted from 
the avoided methane emissions), the net greenhouse gas abatement, and the net 
emissions avoided. The methodology also has extensive rules on monitoring, record 
keeping, and auditing. It lists all the matters that need to be monitored (23 in this 
example), prescribing the parameters and units, as well as the measurement procedure 
and measurement frequency. It also lists 48 types of documentation that must be kept by 
the farmer. These include a Quality Assurance Plan (detailing how the optimum 
performance of the equipment will be maintained for the duration of the project), logs of 
operations of the gas-capture system, piggery-feed usage data and diet analysis, gas-
flow meter information, and the methods of handling the digestate. 
 
Another methodology is for sequestering carbon in soils in grazing systems.88 These 
projects encompass a variety of measures aimed at improving carbon storage in soils. 
Soil carbon can be stored in grazing systems by increasing the amount of organic matter 
in agricultural soils, for instance by converting from continuous cropping to permanent 
pasture, undertaking pasture cropping, managing pasture through implementing pasture 
irrigation, applying organic or synthetic fertiliser to pastures (under certain conditions), 
or rejuvenating pastures, including through seeding (this also includes reducing nitrous-
oxide emissions from soils through tillage), and by managing grazing through changing 
stocking rates, or altering the timing, duration, and intensity of grazing. Farmers can 
 
86 Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) (Destruction of Methane from Piggeries using Engineered 
Biodigesters) Methodology Determination 2013, <https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2015C00572> 
(last accessed on 29 August 2016).  
87 The so-called ‘PigBal’ model, produced by the Government of Queensland and Australian Pork to 
calculate nutrient and salt content in the waste from a piggery. 
88 Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) (Sequestering Carbon in Soils in Grazing Systems) 
Methodology Determination 2014. The complex, 112 page long document is available online 
<https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2015C00582> (last accessed on 29 August 2016). 
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select the measures they want to implement, but must adopt at least one new 
management activity. The land that is used for soil-carbon storage must be delineated in 
accordance with the CFI Mapping Guidelines,89 and must consist of land that had 
permanent pasture for five years or was continuously cropped for the five years before 
the start of the project. The selected land is called a ‘project area’. The farmer can 
exclude parts of the area from the project (‘exclusion areas’). The methodology 
determination evolves around measuring soil carbon, which is done through sampling of 
soils by a qualified person, namely a technician with qualifications from a nationally 
accredited course or recognized by a nationally accredited institution, with 
competencies prescribed in the CFI Soil Sampling and Analysis Method and 
Guidelines.90 The methodology sets detailed rules on sample collection and on the 
analysis of the samples. Sampling starts with baseline sampling, followed by sampling 
at regular intervals, and must take place at a depth of at least 30 centimeters. The 
methodology has rules on how to calculate the baseline carbon stock, the project carbon 
stock, and the project emissions, so as to calculate the net abatement amount. The 
calculations cover the amount of organic carbon in the soil, emissions of methane and 
nitrous oxide from livestock, emissions of nitrous oxide and carbon dioxide from 
synthetic fertilizer, emissions of carbon dioxide from lime, and emissions of nitrous 
oxide, methane, and carbon dioxide from tillage. 
 
Sequestration projects can have a 100-year or a 25-year permanence period.91 There are 
extensive rules on carbon maintenance.92 A ‘carbon maintenance obligation’ is imposed 
upon the sequestration project proponent to avoid a situation where sequestered carbon 
is emitted after the credits have been issued. According to the obligation, it is not 
permitted to carry out activities on lands used for sequestration which result (or are 
likely to result) in a reduction below the benchmark sequestration level of the 
sequestration of carbon in the relevant carbon pool in the area.93 The requirement must 
be registered in the relevant land title register.94 Only ‘permitted carbon activities’ may 
occur on lands used for sequestration. If a reduction below the benchmark sequestration 
level occurs, the owner or occupier of the land must take all reasonable steps to ensure 
that the benchmark level is restored.95 Monitoring requirements apply to monitoring the 
risk of reversal events and known erosion events in the project area, especially when a 
portion of the project area is subject to bare fallow, or to a fire or other event that 
reduces surface vegetation cover below 40 per cent, or when it is converted from 
permanent pasture to cropland with no pasture cover. Once again, the methodology lists 
 
89 Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI) Mapping Guidelines 2015, <https://www.environment.gov.au/climate-
change/emissions-reduction-fund/cfi/publications/cfi-mapping-guidelines-2015> (last accessed on 29 
August 2016).  
90 CFI Soil Sampling and Analysis Method and Guidelines 2014, 
<https://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/emissions-reduction-fund/methods/sequestering-
carbon-in-soils> (last accessed on 29 August 2016).  
91 S. 86A CFI Act. 
92 See extensively Pamela O’Connor, Sharon Christensen, WD Duncan, and Angela Phillips, ‘From 
Rights to Responsibilities: Reconceptualising Carbon Sequestration Rights in Australia’, 30(5) 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 403 (2013). 
93 S. 97(9) CFI Act. 
94 S. 40 CFI Act. 
95 S. 97(10) CFI Act. 
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extensive documentation that must be kept by the farmer, as well as reporting 
requirements. 
 
3.2.2.3. Issuing ACCUs 
 
The second step, after the methodology has been approved, is the formal recognition of 
the project entity. It used to be that the project proponent had to apply to the Clean 
Energy Regulator for recognition under the scheme. The CER would grant recognition 
where the proponent was a ‘fit and proper’ person, not insolvent, etc. This step, 
however, was dropped with the conversion to the ERF, although the CER still checks 
that the applicant is a ‘fit and proper’ person.96 The project will be compared with the 
relevant methodology and a check will be carried out that the emission reductions are 
real and additional. Up until 2015, as soon as a project was approved, the reporting 
period began. Since 2015, the proponent of an eligible project must first seek a carbon 
abatement contract (see next section). After the proponent has secured the funds, the 
project as well as the reporting obligation commence. 
 
The reporting period is a period of between six months and two-to-five years (two for 
emission-avoidance projects and five for sequestration projects). Projects have multiple 
reporting periods. The reports must comply with the requirements of the methodology 
and usually have to be accompanied by an audit report.97 Eligible projects have to 
undergo an initial audit within the first six months of the project, with at least two audits 
to follow.98 The audits must be undertaken by auditors registered under the National 
Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Amendment Regulation 2015.99 A report is used by 
the CER to calculate the number of ACCUs that have been generated by the project, 
using the approved methodology. For each t CO2 eq., one ACCU is issued. For 
sequestration projects, generally there is a 5 per cent deduction to account for the risk of 
reversal.100 
 
After the end of a reporting period, the CER may issue a certificate of entitlement in 
respect of the project for the reporting period.101 That entitlement leads to the issuing of 
ACCUs into the applicant’s account in the Emissions Reduction Fund Register.102 This 
‘first person’ can then transfer these units to someone else, either within Australia or 
internationally. Again, extensive rules regulate these transfers,103 as well as the 
Register.104 As already stated, since 2015, it is primarily the government that purchases 
the ACCUs, which are then transferred to a specified Commonwealth Registry account 
 
96 S. 60 CFI Act and more detailed rules of S. 60-64 CFI Rule, which, for instance, stipulate that the 
authorities can take into account whether individuals, bodies corporate and executive officers of bodies 
corporate committed criminal acts or offenses comprising of dishonest conduct or environmental 
offenses, both domestically or abroad, as well as ‘any other events that the Regulator considers relevant.’ 
97 S. 76(4) CFI Act. 
98 S. 72-80B CFI Rule. 
99 National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Amendment (2015 Measures No. 2) Regulation 2015, No. 
166 (2015). 
100 S. 16 CFI Act. 
101 S. 12 CFI Act. 
102 S. 11 CFI Act. 
103 S. 150-158 CFI Act. 
104 S. 167-169 CFI Act. 
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in accordance with the Australian National Registry of Emissions Units Act 2011.105 
The government is required to publish annual reports on its purchases.106 Credits can be 
issued during the entire crediting period for the project, which is twenty-five years for a 
sequestration project and seven years for an emission-avoidance project, although 
different crediting periods may be set.107 A project may have up to two crediting 
periods. 
 
There are a number of situations in which already-generated ACCUs must be handed 
back. This is the case, for instance, when there has been a reversal of sequestration or 
when it becomes evident that ACCUs were issued based on false or misleading 
information.108 Farmers do not have to hand back ACCUs in case carbon stocks are lost 
due to bushfire, drought, or pest attack, as long as they take reasonable steps to reduce 
the risk of these events and re-establish carbon stores.109 
 
3.2.2.4. Auctions and Carbon-Abatement Contracts 
 
As of July 2015, with the start of the ERF, a new phase was added, in which the CER, 
on behalf of the government, purchases ACCUs through a contract with the farmer. The 
CER can enter into fixed-price carbon-abatement contracts with proponents of eligible 
projects only. It may do so whether or not ACCUs have been created at that point in 
time. There is thus a timing mismatch.110 Usually, a proponent will want to ensure that 
initial investments pay off, and will therefore seek a carbon-abatement contract before 
the project commences. Once a carbon-abatement contract has been secured, the 
proponent can seek funding for the project and secure a forward-investment contract. 
The total duration of a contract cannot be longer than ten years.111  
 
The CER is free to decide how it purchases carbon abatement. It may do so through 
reverse auctioning, tendering, or by another method.112 The purchasing process, 
however, is to comply with six principles: purchase the maximum amount of carbon 
abatement, against the least cost, with not unreasonable administrative costs, in a 
manner that ensures integrity, and that encourages competition and provides fair and 
ethical treatment of all participants.113 So far, purchases have been through reverse 
auctions, in which a project proponent bids a price for the carbon abatement expected 
from the project.114 The winning bids, i.e. those that achieve the largest amount of 
 
105 S. 20H CFI Act, and Australian National Registry of Emissions Units Act 2011, No. 99 (2011). 
106 S. 163A CFI Act. 
107 S. 69 CFI Act. 
108 S. 88 CFI Act. 
109 S. 91 CFI Act. 
110 Macintosh, supra note 76, at 191; Climate Change Authority, Carbon Farming Initiative Review 
(Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2014), at 33. These costs, on the other hand, are deductible under 
tax law, Celeste Black and Michael Dirkis, ‘Farming Carbon: Taxation Implications of the Carbon 
Farming Initiative’, 21(1) Revenue Law Journal 1 (2012) at 13-14. 
111 S. 10 CFI Rule. 
112 S. 20F CFI Act. 
113 S. 20G(3) CFI Act. 
114 Auctions took place in April 2015, November 2015 and April 2016. The next auction is planned for 
November or December 2016. For auction results, see 
<http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ERF/Auctions-results> (last accessed on 29 August 2016).  
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abatement against the lowest price, are contracted.115 These are regular contracts under 
contract law.116 Both regular government procurement law and public governance and 
accountability law, however, are not applicable.117 Carbon-abatement contracts must be 




The CER is responsible for the enforcement of the scheme. It monitors compliance, not 
only by checking the information at its disposal (project information, audited reports, 
etc.), but also by conducting independent audits itself119 and by undertaking site 
inspections.120 The CER can impose a range of administrative sanctions, such as 
requiring the relinquishment of a specific number of ACCUs (when issued on the basis 
of false or misleading information, or when a sequestration project ends before the end 
of the permanence period),121 accepting so-called ‘enforceable undertakings’ from a 
regulated entity (these being written statements from a person or organization that they 
will do certain things to improve compliance with the legislation, which are published 
on the internet, and may, if breached, result in court action),122 or issuing infringement 
notices. The CER can also pursue legal action for breaches of civil-penalty provisions, 
in which case pecuniary damages are sought through the court, for instance when the 
project proponent infringes carbon-maintenance obligations. Criminal sanctions, 
including imprisonment, may also apply.123 If a person is convicted of an offence 
relating to fraudulent conduct and the issue of ACCUs is attributable to the commission 
of the offence, the court may order relinquishment of a specified number of ACCUs.124 
 
3.2.3. Adding a Cap: The ‘Safeguard Mechanism’ 
 
On 1 July 2016, the so-called ‘safeguard mechanism’ took effect. This is laid down in 
the (amended) National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 and in related 
regulations.125 It sets a (modest) cap on the emissions of Australia’s major GHG-
emitting industrial and electricity facilities (>100,000 t CO2 eq. a year), covering 
roughly half of all emissions. This is seen as an important supplement to the ERF, as 
without the cap, a decrease in emissions through the projects financed under the ERF 
might be accompanied by an increase elsewhere, thus rendering the ERF ineffective. As 
 
115 A model carbon abatement contract is available online through 
<http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ERF/Want-to-participate-in-the-Emissions-Reduction-
Fund/Step-2-Contracts-and-auctions> (last on accessed 29 August 2016).  
116 S. 20K CFI Act. 
117 S. 20J CFI Act determines that the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013, nor 
the Commonwealth Procurement Rules under the Financial Management and Accountability Regulations 
1997 apply.  
118 S. 168(5) CFI Act. 
119 S. 213-215 CFI Act. 
120 S. 194-208 CFI Act. 
121 S. 88-91 CFI Act. 
122 S. 237 CFI Act. 
123 Either under provisions on fraudulent conduct or false and misleading statements of the Criminal Code 
1995, or under S. 234-235 CFI Act. 
124 S. 171 CFI Act. 
125 National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007, No. 175 (2007) as amended through the Carbon 
Farming Initiative Amendment Act 2014, No. 119 (2014). 
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facilities can comply with the cap (called a ‘baseline’) by purchasing ACCUs (from 
farmers, for example) and surrendering them to offset their emissions,126 the safeguard 
mechanism may be expected to lead to an increase in private purchases of ACCUs from 
non-ERF funded CFI projects.127 
 
4. Experiences with the Carbon Credits (CFI) Act 
 
After having described the regulatory design of the Australian instrument in the 
previous section, we now to practice, in order to discover the experiences of the various  
stakeholders involved with the scheme, as well as the pros and cons of the regulatory 
approach. In this section I report on the findings of my empirical research on Australia’s 
regulatory framework aimed at reducing emissions from agriculture. First, I explain the 
methodology used; I then discuss the implementation of the CFI Act by presenting 
information on the number of projects run by farmers under the Act, as well as an 
indication of the kinds of farm projects. There follows the largest part of this section, 
which reports on stakeholders’ views on the impact of the CFI Act, with a focus on 
farmers’ motivation to participate in the CFI/ERF, the role of consultants, the impact of 
the change from a market-based to a government-funded scheme, the financing gap, 
administration and compliance, the scope of the scheme and its methodologies, the 
results of the scheme for the environment as well as for individual farmers, and the way 




The empirical part of the research consisted of a brief case-study phase and a longer 
interview phase. Case studies into selected projects under the CFI/ERF were conducted 
to get a better understanding of the kinds of project that are run on farms and to provide 
some background information for the interviews. All of the 630 projects on the ERF 
Register (as of 1 May 2016) were assessed against pre-determined selection criteria.128 
A total of seven cases were selected: two cases of methane capture in piggeries, two 
cases of sequestration of grazing land, one case of reforestation, and two avoided-
deforestation cases. Information for the case studies was primarily gathered through 
publicly available sources, such as government and media websites. 
 
The bulk of the empirical data was generated in interviews with the main stakeholders 
at a general level, i.e. representative associations for the farming industry, consultancy 
firms that help farmers to apply and run projects under the CFI/ERF (‘carbon agents’), 
financial and accountancy firms that are actively involved with the CFI/ERF, and 
government officials working with the regulatory framework. At least 2-3 interviews 
took place within each of these four stakeholder categories, sometimes with more than 
 
126 S. 22XF National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007. 
127 The first surrender of ACCUs to avoid excess emissions situation is due 28 February 2018, see 
<http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/NGER/The-safeguard-mechanism/Key-dates> (last accessed 
on 29 August 2016).  
128 E.g.: the projects should be representative also for the other parts of the world, the projects should 
entail different types of farms and different mitigation actions, the projects should, ideally, also entail 
some adaptation actions, the projects should be representative for its kind, the projects should be in 
various jurisdictions so as to find possible differences in implementation across jurisdictions. 
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one person from one organization participating. Leading members of the stakeholder 
organizations were interviewed, such as CEOs and directors, and sometimes specialized 
natural resources/sustainability managers, both past and present. They were the most 
qualified persons within each organization, given the law and policy focus of the 
project.129 In addition to the interviews, some information on the functioning of the 
CFI/ERF, particularly its past functioning, was obtained from the Australian Climate 
Change Authority’s 2014 review of the CFI.130 The validity of the findings from the 
interviews was tested in one stakeholder seminar and two academic seminars and in two 
additional interviews with senior representatives of the carbon consultancy sector and of 
a major climate change NGO.131 
 
4.2. Introduction: Figures and Examples of Carbon-Farming Projects  
 
4.2.1. Number of On-Farm CFI/ERF Projects 
 
When the carbon-farming scheme took off, farmers were reluctant to participate. The 
majority of methodology determinations were for activities in the forest and waste 
sectors.132 As of December 2014, there were 178 CFI projects.133 Only 4 per cent of 
these were agricultural projects.134 Only 1 per cent of the ACCUs were credited to 
agricultural projects.135 By then, the CFI had led to a 2-per-cent reduction in emissions 
covered by the CFI.136 All agricultural-project credits were issued to projects which 
destroyed methane generated from manure in piggeries.137 According to the Climate 
Change Authority’s review, poor participation by the agricultural sector was almost 
entirely attributed to policy uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty about the future of the heavily 
debated Australian ETS and the possible impact on the carbon price of linkage with the 
EU ETS.138 Other (potential) barriers were: lack of methodologies; difficulty of 
compliance with methodologies; limited access to capital; lack of economies of scale on 
many farms; and difficulty of access to information about emission-reduction 
projects.139 These challenges were exacerbated by the presence of many small and 
 
129 Interviews were conducted in April and May 2016. Due to EU ethics requirements, this article does 
not refer to the names of the persons interviewed. Interview reports for each interview are on file with the 
author. Anonymized interview reports are stored in the Tilburg University data storage facility. 
130 Climate Change Authority, supra note 108. 
131 The seminars took place in May and July 2016, the validation interviews in August 2016. 
132 Climate Change Authority, supra note 110, at 17. 
133 Ibid., at 19. 
134 46% were landfill and waste treatment projects, 19% were avoided deforestation projects, 19% were 
other types of forest projects, 13% were savanna burning projects. Ibid., at 19. 
135 61% of credits have been for landfill and waste treatment projects, 29% for avoided deforestation 
projects, 5% for reforestation and other forestry projects (these are likely to generate increasing amounts 
of credits over time because forest growth generally accelerates five to ten years after planting), 4% for 
savanna burning projects. Ibid., at 20. 
136 As at 3 December 2014, 10.6 million credits had been issued. On average, this is about 2.5m tCO2-e 
per year. 
137 Ibid., at 30. 
138 Ibid., at 32. The review is very clear about this: ‘Policy uncertainty plays havoc with price 
expectations, in this case about future prices for credits, because a change in policy settings can change 
demand. Heightened uncertainty over future prices increases the risks around expected revenue streams 
from a project, deterring some potential participants from taking up a project.’ 
139 Climate Change Authority, supra note 9, at 304. 
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dispersed participants in the sector (55 per cent of Australia’s farm businesses report 
operations valued at less than AU$100,000/US$76,500).140 
 
The situation changed once the link with emission trading was cut off and the ERF 
became operational. The first reverse auction took place in April 2015, i.e. before the 
actual launch of the ERF. It was accessible only to those sectors covered by the original 
CFI scheme. About half of the proposed emission reductions (28 Mt CO2 eq.) came 
from farm projects—mainly avoided deforestation and soil-sequestration projects. 
While the agricultural sector feared that it would be outbid by larger players, such as 
energy producers and large industry when they entered the scene,141 the second auction, 
the first one under the ERF, proved that fear unjustified. The lion’s share of carbon-
abatement contracts went to farmers and landowners, for agriculture, forestry, and land-
use projects.142 According to news reports, ‘big industry, which was expected to take up 
more of this round of funding, was late with its projects’.143 About 9 per cent of 
abatement in this auction was for agricultural projects (excluding vegetation).144 Thus, 
under the ERF, the agricultural sector began to increase its share of carbon abatement, 
compared to the situation under the CFI. The third auction took place in April 2016 and 
saw a further increase in the share of farmers and landowners.145 After three auctions, a 
total of 309 carbon-abatement contracts have been awarded, to deliver more than 143 
Mt CO2 eq. of abatement.
146 
 
Moreover, as of May 2016, a total of 630 projects had been registered in the ERF 
Register,147 a dramatic increase from December 2014, when only 178 projects had been 




Savanna burning 70 
Energy efficiency 36 
Agriculture, consisting of: 
- sequestration grazing lands 
- methane capture/biogas piggeries 







141 Sarina Locke, ‘Farms Could be Shut out of Next Emission Reduction Fund Auction Given Big 
Corporates will be Competing’, ABC Rural News, 27 April 2015, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-
27/carbon-farming-auction-good-start-to-reducing-emissions/6418792> (last accessed on 29 August 
2016).  
142 Sarina Locke, ‘Landholders the Biggest Winners in $550 Million Carbon Abatement Auction’, ABC 
Rural New (13 November 2015), <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-12/landholders-biggest-winners-
in-carbon-abatement-auction/6935968> (last accessed on 29 August 2016). Details of the auction results 
are available on the CER’s website http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ERF/Auctions-results.  
143 Ibid. Industrial projects received 12% of all funding (AU$ 69m). 
144 As is shown at the CER’s ’s website <http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ERF/Auctions-
results/November-2015> (last accessed on 29 August 2016).  
145 According to the CER’s website, <http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ERF/Auctions-
results/april-2016> (last accessed on 29 August 2016).  
146 Ibid. 
147 See <http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ERF/project-and-contracts-registers/project-register> 
(accessed on 26 May 2016). 
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Industrial fugitives 10 
Transport 8 
 
It is important to reiterate that farmers have been frequently involved in projects that 
appear under categories other than agriculture, especially vegetation and savanna 
burning (these being fire-management measures to reduce the risk of wildfires). It is 
estimated that the majority of the vegetation projects and savanna burning projects, 
which achieve an abatement of 98.5 and 8 Mt CO2 eq., respectively, occur on farmland, 
with the revenue going to farming businesses.148  
 
4.2.2. Illustrative CFI/ERF Projects Run by Farmers 
 
To get a better idea of the kind of on-farm project that has been successful under the 
ERF, a few case-study examples will be discussed here. 
 
4.2.2.1. Methane Capture in Piggeries  
 
An intensive pig farm in Victoria, with 12,000 pigs, on 2,000 acres, and with fifteen 
staff, received a carbon-abatement contract in April 2015 for the capture of biogas 
generated from the decomposition of the piggery manure in biodigester-style anaerobic 
lagoons and the combustion of the methane component of the biogas. The owner of this 
piggery sees himself as an innovator. Since the early 1980s, he has been introducing 
new technologies and spends AU$300,000 (US$229,630) per year on capital works, 
including farm improvements, continuously trying to improve production to meet 
health-and-safety and environmental standards.149 The organization has been highly 
automated and uses written procedures for its staff. It has received Quality Assurance 
Accreditation, a voluntary certification scheme by Australia Pork, which focuses on 
animal welfare and food safety. The sector is well aware of the negative environmental 
impacts of pig farming. The main environmental issues are the odour and dealing with 
large quantities of effluent.150 Reducing odour was achieved by modifying the design of 
the sheds. Piggery manure effluent was dealt with by installing technologies to capture 
methane from the waste and convert it into biogas, and to re-use the waste digestate as 
organic fertilizer. It is the latter project that was contracted under the ERF. The project 
is relevant to three environmental problems: methane emissions are reduced (the 
effluent treatment and recycling system used at the farm has resulted in an 81-per-cent 
reduction in emissions at the site),151 renewable energy is generated, displacing fossil 
fuels used for heating and power generation, and a significant reduction in odour is 
achieved.152 The total number of ACCUs issued for 2014/15 and 2015/16 was 18,590, 
i.e. an abatement of 9,290 t CO2 eq. per annum. 
 
148 Interview with Clean Energy Regulator representatives, 10 May 2016. 
149 Lyndal Thorburn and John Langdale, Embracing Change. Case Studies on How Australian Firms Use 
Incremental Innovation to Support Growth (Sydney, Australia: Macquarie University 2003), at 97. 
150 Ibid., at 98. 
151 Alex Sampson, ‘Piggery and Compost Company up for Premier’s Sustainability Awards’, Weekly 
Times, 30 September 2014, <http://www.weeklytimesnow.com.au/agribusiness/piggery-and-compost-
company-up-for-premiers-sustainability-awards/news-story/70b5b7eef394b48119fd4d93cf6adb80> (last 
accessed on 29 August 2016).  





4.2.2.2. Sequestration in Grazing Land  
 
An organic cattle farm in Queensland registered a project in October 2015 aimed at 
removing CO2 from the atmosphere by sequestering carbon in its soil-grazing system. 
The farm uses a targeted method of rotational grazing, moving cattle to paddocks as 
soon as the grass stops growing, allowing the cattle to graze in it and start the growth 
process again, thus accelerating the increase of carbon uptake.153 This particular farmer 
was involved in developing the methodology in association with Central Queensland 
University;154 he is also the chairman of Healthy Soils Inc. Landcare, an organization 
that ‘conducts research on farm trials and other methodologies to assist landholders, 
farmers and graziers to improve long term viability meanwhile reducing their reliance 
on chemicals; thus, reducing soil degradation and erosion’.155 Another example of the 
same method is a sequestration project in New South Wales, also registered in October 
2015. It is part of a bigger on-farm innovation project which began in 2002; it includes 
the construction of leaky weirs and swales to slow water flow.156 This has increased soil 
moisture and vegetation growth. Targeted grazing has increased soil organic matter and 
encouraged regeneration of native grasses. Both grazing and the number of livestock 
present fluctuate with the carrying capacity of the area. Next to the mitigation achieved, 
the latter project has led to remarkable co-benefits, such as a 250-per-cent increase in 
stock-carrying capacity, a 15-to-23-per-cent profit margin on cattle production, a 
constant river outflow regardless of inflow, improved landscape hydrology, and 
increased native biodiversity.157 By June 2016, these two projects, while registered, had 
not yet received a contract. 
 
4.2.2.3. Reforestation by Mallee Plantings  
 
Typical for the south of Western Australia are reforestation projects involving the 
planting and management of mallee trees (a vegetation group that occurs in semi-arid 
areas of southern Australia) on agricultural land both to store carbon and to stop 
degradation and salinization of farmland. It is a good example of a measure that 
achieves both mitigation and adaptation simultaneously. The mallee oil, harvested from 
the trees, can be sold as a biofuel. So far, lack of investment in oil and in mallee-oil-
powered biomass generators is preventing large-scale biofuel production from 
mallee.158 These projects have a twenty-five-year permanence period and were 
registered as eligible projects under the ERF in April 2015 by a Sydney-based carbon 
 
153 Rachel Conaghan, ‘Soil Test Breaks Vital Ground’, Rural Weekly, 27 March 2015, 
<http://www.ruralweekly.com.au/news/soil-test-breaks-vital-ground/2585983/> (last accessed on 29 
August 2016).  
154 Ibid.; CQUni, ‘CQUni Researchers Involved in Healthy Soils Field’ (Media Release, 22 July 2014). 
155 See the Healthy Soils Inc. website, <http://www.healthysoils.org.au> (last accessed on 29 August 
2016).  
156 Soils for Life, Case study. Innovations for Regenerative Landscape Management Project (Fairbairn, 
Australia: Outcomes Australia, 2012), at 128-35.  
157 Ibid. With such co-benefits, questions arise as to the role of the ERF (Is the ERF the real push factor 
for the changes in agricultural practices? What is the additionality? What is the role of public funding?). 
These questions will be discussed in the next section below. 
158 Sean Murphy, ‘Mallee Oil’, ABC TV Broadcast, 22 June 2014, 
<http://www.abc.net.au/landline/content/2014/s4030485.htm> (last accessed on 29 August 2016).  
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agent on behalf of local farmers in Western Australia. One was granted a carbon 
abatement contract by the CER under the ERF in April 2015. No ACCUs had been 
issued as of 1 June 2016. 
 
4.2.2.4. Avoided Deforestation  
 
A project in New South Wales under the avoided-deforestation methodology involves 
the protection of 8,500 hectares of native forest through the prevention of clearing and 
clear-felling harvesting activities. The farmer in this case had already received a permit 
to clear trees for grazing land. Under the project, the farmer manages the forest for 
protection over a 100-year period. Management includes installing fire breaks around 
the forest to prevent bushfire damage. This project was jointly developed by two carbon 
agents and leads to an additional revenue stream for the farmer, which is especially 
important considering that his property is located in a drought-prone area.159 A contract 
was awarded under the ERF in April 2015, with a total of 238,828 ACCUs issued. The 
project has a permanence obligation until 6 June 2114. A similar case under the 
avoided-deforestation method involves the protection of 7,000 hectares of dry native 
forest on farmland as part of a bigger on-farm project to drought-proof the land. This 
project was contracted in April 2015 and received 252,681 ACCUs. The money raised 
from the ERF was used to buy another property and put on new workers.160 A carbon 
agent assists the farmer with the administrative work; in return, the agent takes a cut of 
the carbon credits.161 
 
4.3. Stakeholders’ Experiences with Carbon Farming in Australia 
 
4.3.1. Farmers’ Motivation to Run Projects Under the CFI/ERF 
 
4.3.1.1. Slow Start, Growing Interest, and Attitude Change 
 
In the course of the interviews, all respondents agreed that the CFI, and especially the 
ERF, has changed and still is changing the attitudes of farmers towards climate-smart 
agriculture. Carbon agents, representatives of farmers’ organizations and of financial 
institutions, all stressed that the farming sector, generally, is very conservative. Farmers 
tend to stick to traditional work methods and have a negative attitude towards 
environmental and climate policies, as these may interfere with their preferred 
agricultural practices. ‘Farmers felt that carbon was a bad thing that would only cost 
them money.’ It took years of convincing by the government and by project developers 
to get farmers interested. In the early years, the CFI was pushed by carbon agents or 
‘aggregators’. The carbon agents developed methodologies, lobbied with the 
government to get them recognized in law, developed projects, and knocked on farmers’ 
doors to persuade them to implement them. The farmers’ organizations were quite 
 
159 Anonymous, ‘Forest Project Gets Approval’, Narromine News Online, 29 January 2014, 
<http://www.narrominenewsonline.com.au/story/2053451/forest-project-gets-approval/> (last accessed 
on 29 August 2016).  
160 Tom Arup, ‘Wide, Brown Land Becomes a Home to Carbon Farming’, Sydney Morning Herald, 17 
August 2014, <http://www.smh.com.au/national/wide-brown-land-becomes-a-home-to-carbon-farming-




reluctant to be engaged, with the exception of Australia Pork. This lobby group for the 
piggery industry had a methodology developed and accepted by the government and 
persuaded its members to implement it. Thus, in the pork sector, the sector’s 
organization played the role of carbon agents in other sectors. In the beginning, it was 
mainly those farmers who are always interested in improving environmental 
performance who became engaged, as well as big farms that were approached by 
aggregators. According to a representative from a major farmers’ organization, those in 
the latter category were often desperate farmers in areas struck by drought, such as in 
western New South Wales. They were desperate for cash; for some of them, the 
prospect of twenty-five years of income was the only way out. 
 
After a few years of experience with the CFI/ERF, farmers are increasingly realizing 
that they can make money through carbon projects. A carbon agent said that a familiar, 
somewhat ironic, phrase among consultants involved with farmers is that ‘you can get 
an idea in a farmer’s head only through a cheque book’. It is generally felt that the price 
certainty offered by the ERF has had the biggest influence on farmers’ participation 
rates. As indicated above, the data indeed show a large jump in the number of registered 
projects after the introduction of the ERF, a jump that surprised many (see section 4.3.3, 
below). Carbon agents have noticed that farmers have begun to approach them, instead 
of the other way around. It should also be stressed, though, that the vast majority of 
farmers currently are not engaged in ERF projects. 
 
4.3.1.2. An Aging Sector 
 
Most respondents referred to the fact that those working in the agricultural sector in 
Australia are aging. Several respondents pointed out that the average age of a farmer is 
57-58 years, and 99 per cent of the farms are family businesses.162 The sector is facing a 
transition to a younger generation. Often, there are no children who want to take over a 
farm, in which case farmers must find a buyer. As a consequence, many farmers are 
only interested in securing sufficient income for the next ten years or so, and do not 
look further ahead. The additional income from the ERF allows this group of farmers to 
have a smoother generational transition. The CFI/ERF assists in the diversification of 
agricultural practices and in succession planning. It allows, for instance, a farmer to buy 
land from the aging farmer next door, using funds generated through vegetation projects 
under the CFI/ERF on the newly acquired land. 
 
It was also generally felt that the older generation of farmers is much more reluctant to 
move towards sustainable or climate-smart farming than the younger generation. This 
indicates that there should be a growth in potential for climate-smart agriculture after 
the transition to the next generation. 
 
162 Data on the number of family owned farms are consistent, see National Farmers’ Federation, NFF 
Farm Facts: 2012 (Kingston, Australia: National Farmers’ Federation, 2012) at 5-6, as well as the Nexus 
Commonwealth of Nations Network website on agriculture in Australia, 
<http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/sectors-australia/business/agriculture/> (last accessed on 29 
August 2016). The average age is more difficult to establish, see ibid., at 6 (52 years), and Victorian 
Farmers Federation, ‘Inquiry into the Capacity of the Farming Sector to Attract and Retain Young 
Farmers and Respond to an Ageing Workforce’ (Melbourne, Australia: Victorian Farmers Federation, 




Banks are aware of the problem of aging and are looking for financial solutions to 
achieve a smooth transition to younger farmers. Integration of farms is financially 
challenging, as it leads to larger farms and a larger financial burden on young farmers. 
The new generation often also has to buy out brothers or sisters who do not want to be 
involved in farming. One respondent indicated that his bank is in the process of 
developing a financial product that helps a young farmer to buy up land from an older 
farmer by offering him or her a longer period of financing. The bank would remain 
involved for five years, as would the older farmer. In this way, the bank offers the 
younger farmer long-term financial security, while the older farmer stays involved in 
the land (which is deemed important from a social perspective). 
 
4.3.1.3. Small Farms 
 
In the early years of the CFI, only large farms were targeted by the carbon agents. 
Respondents mentioned several reasons for that. At the start, there was a lot of 
uncertainty about whether the CFI was going to work and be economically viable for 
farmers. Also, there were implementation issues. The high level of complexity implied 
an involvement of large farms, which could take risks and deal with the complexity. 
Soil-carbon measures, for example, need to be implemented for three years before one 
can claim ACCUs. This requires an upfront investment that small farms cannot easily 
take. The transaction costs are considered high, and legal issues connected to the 
CFI/ERF can be difficult (due not only to the complexity of the scheme but to wider 
legal circumstances such as the existence of ‘native title’ on agricultural property, i.e. 
aboriginal land-use rights). Another important reason for the involvement of primarily 
large farms is the fact that larger volumes of abatement can be achieved on them, which 
is more profitable for consultants. 
 
How to involve the majority of farms in Australia, which are relatively small family 
businesses?163 Carbon agents can aggregate small-farm projects into one large project. 
With the introduction of the ERF, aggregation has been the government’s specific 
policy.164 CER respondents indicated that this was a successful policy change. A 
handful of large aggregators are very active under the ERF, especially with vegetation 
projects. Sometimes landowners are the project proponents, helped by the aggregators; 
in other cases, the aggregators themselves are the proponents. This decreases the 
administrative burden and fixed costs for smaller farms. Some respondents, both 
agribusiness representatives and carbon agents, said that aggregation has a risk: it is 
much more difficult to manage an aggregated project, because one must make sure that 
all farmers involved comply with the rules. If one farmer does not comply, the whole 
project is jeopardized. Partly in order to avoid this risk, smaller farms are now 
becoming involved individually as well. Since there is presently more expertise, and 
processes have become more automated, there are fewer overhead costs and risks. 
Moreover, better methodologies could increase the level of abatement on smaller farms 
and thus contribute to greater participation by smaller farms.165 
 
163 Similarly, Climate Change Authority, supra note 9, at 304. 
164 Following the suggestion made by Climate Change Authority, ibid. 
165 The Climate Change Authority recommended to simplify methodologies to increase participation by 




Farmers’ organizations’ representatives added: ‘Aggregation is expensive and the risks 
usually are not with the aggregators but with the land holders. For small farms, the costs 
of aggregation are too big.’ To engage the vast majority of relatively small farms, they 
suggested a ‘whole of farm approach’. When a relatively small farm wants to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, the most effective way, they said, is to introduce a range of 
measures across the farm that together lead to a reduction in emissions. Under the 
current scheme, however, the farmer must have, e.g., three separate projects under 
different methods with all the administration and overheads that go with that. He or she 
may have to deal with more than one aggregator, which is costly as well. Having a 
balance of different methodologies on one farm, according to one respondent, is a way 
to generate more abatement and more income from the ERF. A ‘whole of farm 
approach’ also reduces risks: if one method does not work in the long run, the farmer 
can intensify other methods to achieve the same overall reductions. 
 
4.3.2. The Role of Consultants 
 
Consultants (carbon agents, aggregators) have promoted the scheme from the start. 
They developed the most successful methodologies. The avoided-deforestation 
methodology, for instance, was seen through by two firms. These firms invested much 
time and money into the development of the methodologies without the certainty that 
they would be adopted by the government. In interviews, they noted that they took 
risks, but were ultimately successful, and now earn part of their income from the 
avoided-deforestation projects on the farmland they supervise. Another firm has been 
especially active with the mallee-oil and soil-carbon methodologies. Thus, carbon 
agents target certain types of project. They promote ‘their’ methodology with farmers 
and largely take over the application, monitoring, reporting, and auditing work from the 
farmers, in exchange for a portion of the ERF or private-carbon-market income. Some 
even provide upfront finance for the farmer to initiate the project. Different carbon 
agents operate under different financial arrangements, but overall it seems that around 
30 per cent of the funds generated go to the consultants. 
 
While most carbon agents are based in large cities (and then mostly in Sydney), some 
have rural roots. Some are quite small and outsource most of the work to local 
consultants in the area where the projects are being set up, while others have a large 
(30+) staff and do all the work themselves. The more complex legal work, such as 
drafting contracts in complex situations, including financial contracts with lenders, is 
often outsourced to legal advisors at law firms or legal consultants. 
 
The only sector in which consultants have not dominated’ seems to be the piggery 
sector with its methane-to-biogas projects. Here, it was Australia Pork that led 
development of the methodology and encouraged its members to implement it and 
apply for ERF funds. In this sector, farmers do the monitoring and reporting themselves 
without the help of consultants. Once the technology has been installed and is working, 
monitoring is fairly easy as it is largely automated. The external auditor tells the farmer 




All respondents were positive about the consultants: ‘They are needed and do a lot of 
good work.’ Respondents from the CER and Department of the Environment stressed 
the need to have economies of scale: ‘Aggregators are needed in order to make a policy 
scheme work, in order to get individuals to apply. It has always been a government 
policy to facilitate the creation of such companies so as to aggregate the implementation 
of policy goals.’ 
 
Aggregation works both ways: in the direction of the farmers and in the direction of the 
competent authority. The authorities deal with a relatively small number of 
knowledgeable aggregators. In the interviews, government officials acknowledged that 
the success of the ERF is largely due to the efforts of the carbon agents and their 
aggregation efforts: ‘Without them, participation in the scheme would have been much 
lower, and abatement would have been tiny.’ 
 
Several respondents indicated that there are two ways in which the integrity of the 
consultants is checked. The carbon agents must have a financial-services license (under 
corporate law). The CFI Act has the fit-and-proper person test, which allows the CER to 
assess the integrity of the aggregators when they register a project, and ‘to knock them 
out of the scheme if they breach the law’, to quote one of the representatives of the 
CER. 
 
4.3.3. CFI v. ERF: Carbon Market or Fixed Price 
 
All stakeholders maintained that the transition from the CFI to the ERF gave an 
enormous boost to the scheme. Under the CFI, everyone had a low price expectation 
because of policy uncertainty and because offsets for industry could cover only five per 
cent of allowances.166 Now, under the ERF, farmers receive long-term contracts (mostly 
for ten years), with a guaranteed income stream. This is considered important by 
Australian farmers, who often face droughts, floods, and fluctuating markets. It also 
makes it easier for them to negotiate with the banks when seeking funding. The CER 
emphasized that the government offers farmers commercially fair and balanced 
contracts. For example, they take bushfire risks into account, and carbon contracts do 
not have the ‘termination for convenience clause’ that government contracts usually 
have (and which allows successive governments to end a contract concluded by a 
previous government). This is aimed at ensuring that farmers get a fair contract with a 
ten-year certainty. 
 
The carbon agents interviewed saw the price certainty as the main reason for the success 
of the ERF. ‘Farmers want to know what they will get paid. Under the CFI, we could 
not give them a price guarantee. Now we can. This allows service providers to step in 
and develop projects.’ Another carbon agent said: 
 
Thanks to the ERF this has become commercially viable. A huge increase in the number 
of projects and the amount of abatement is achieved, much more abatement than ever 
anticipated. I think the ERF is a huge success. It has pushed the whole process: projects 
were developed, implemented, monitored, which leads, step by step, to more knowledge, 
 




farmers gradually step up mitigation and adaptation measures, the whole sector is 
learning and changing. We need the land sector for mitigation and adaptation. This is 
kick-starting that process because it leads to revenue for farmers and service providers. 
 
The repeal of the ETS and the introduction of abatement contracts under the ERF did 
not put an end to the sale of ACCUs to private-market parties. Private companies such 
as Santos (an Australian oil and gas company) and the Australian airline Qantas still 
buy farm-generated ACCUs for their private offset programmes. 
 
However, there are some concerns about the ERF, especially in relation to the open 
auction market. It is still feared—even though the fears have not been realized—that 
farmers cannot compete with big industries and energy producers with a lot of capital. A 
respondent from an agribusiness organization suggested introducing a partitioning of 
the budget so that part always goes to agricultural projects.  
 
4.3.4. Funding Project Investments 
 
The issue of the financing gap was referred to in section 3.2.2.4: farmers must invest in 
a project before they can generate emission reductions, and only then sell them to the 
government under the ERF. The CER interviewees indicated that it was a deliberate 
policy decision to grant payment after the delivery of abatement. The huge increase in 
the number of registered projects since the start of the ERF indicates, according to the 
CER, that the financing gap is not a significant issue. 
 
Other respondents saw the financing gap as a limitation for most project types. In the 
piggeries sector, producers have to buy and install methane-capture and biogas-
production technologies. It was said that, in the pork sector, small- and medium-size 
farms, especially, need kick-start funding. As the agricultural sector is not eligible for 
the government’s subsidy scheme to promote renewable-energy technology 
(ARENA),167 farmers have to seek loans from banks—either small, niche, banks, such 
as the Clean Energy Finance Corporation,168 or, more commonly, the farmer’s home 
bank. Sequestration projects also have upfront costs: they have an impact on farming 
activity, they take time, and need investment in compost, recycled soil amendments, and 
soil additives. Only grazing management has no major upfront costs, for such projects 
usually involve the introduction of a different grazing management, or destocking, or 
setting aside of land. Carbon agents get paid only after ERF income is received. 
According to the agents, this is necessary, or the scheme would be unaffordable to 
farmers. As already indicated, sometimes aggregators finance not only their own 
upfront costs but also those of farmers, ahead of the issuance of ACCUs. 
 
 
167 The Australian Renewable Energy Agency’s (ARENA) subsidy programme is primarily aimed at the 
energy sector and has as its main aims improving the competitiveness of renewable energy technologies 
and increasing the supply of renewable energy in Australia, see <http://arena.gov.au/funding/> (last 
visited on 29 August 2016). 
168 The Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC) is a commercial investment organization, created by 
the Australian government under the Clean Energy Finance Corporation Act 2012. It invests in projects 
concerning renewable energy, energy efficiency and low emissions technologies, including in the 
agricultural sector, see <http://www.cleanenergyfinancecorp.com.au/energy-efficiency/agriculture.aspx> 
(last visited on 29 August 2016). 
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An agribusiness organization’s representative indicated that there is a strong reluctance 
among banks to provide approval for sequestration projects. Banks that have mortgages 
on land turn down sequestration projects because they think it is too risky to have such a 
long-term commitment on the land. For some methodologies, a trade-off is thought to 
exist between the carbon enterprise and agricultural productivity. That is undesirable, 
not just for farmers, but for financers as well. 
 
One bank made the national media because it turned down two financing propositions 
from farmers who had ERF projects.169 In this case, the bank rejected the proposals 
because the overall financial situation of the applicant farmers was bad. For them, the 
ERF was the only profitable activity—an escape from bad business. The bank’s 
respondent said: ‘We want to finance strong sustainable businesses, that do CFI/ERF 
projects to diversify their activities, but that have a good product on the food and fibre 
market as well.’ A respondent for a major agribusiness organization made a similar 
point: ‘for some drought-struck farms, the ERF is the only hope. That, however, is not 
deemed sustainable.’ 
 
Carbon farming, therefore, is not looked upon by banks in isolation, but as an element 
of a broader transition towards sustainability. Thus some banks have developed a 
financial product offering favourable financing conditions to farmers who want to 
change to sustainable agriculture, not focusing just on carbon, but on a range of 
different indicators (e.g. waste management, recycling, improved irrigation and soil 
management, animal welfare etc.). All respondents mentioned the often substantial co-
benefits for farmers who are engaged in carbon-farming projects, such as energy 
savings, greater water retention, improved soil quality, and reversal of salination or 
erosion. Often these co-benefits offer an additional incentive for farmers (see, further, 
section 4.3.7, below). 
 
4.3.5. Administration and Compliance 
 
4.3.5.1. Competent Authority’s Perspective 
 
When asked about the integrity of the scheme, the interviewees at the CER stressed that 
one has to look at the whole scheme, from project registration to auditing and 
accreditation. They said that there are four phases prior to a project’s commencement: 
project registration; auction qualification; auction registration; and auction. The CER 
carries out a risk-based check at the registration phase. The ‘fit and proper person test’ 
is an important instrument to ensure integrity: ‘Who are we dealing with? What have 
been this person’s activities in the past?’ 
 
After the auction, there are again several stages at which integrity is checked. First, in 
the contract phase, the CER can set ‘condition precedent’, for instance that payment is 
subject to local government planning approval for the project, or subject to finding 
finance to cover the project. The CER respondents indicated that the CER purchases 
between fifty and a hundred per cent of abatement, so there is some room for caution: 
 
169 See for instance, Sue Neales, ‘Heartache as Carbon Credits Turn to Debt’, Weekly Times, 20 May 
2014, <http://www.weeklytimesnow.com.au/news/national/heartache-as-carbon-credits-turn-to-
debt/story-fnkfnspy-1226923533045> (last visited on 29 August 2016). 
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they can decide to only buy part of the expected abatement when there is doubt about 
the reliability of the claim. This does not imply that the CER issues contracts to projects 
it has doubts about. It simply is not always possible to predict exactly how much 
abatement will actually be achieved in the entire project from start to finish, as this is 
also dependent on unpredictable variables such as weather conditions.  
 
Then there is the auditing phase. The CER relies heavily on the audit reports. Under the 
CFI, an audit was needed for every report/claim for credits. Under the ERF, it was 
decided to reduce this burden. The current scheme requires a minimum of three audits. 
According to the CER respondents, this is sufficient to check the integrity of the 
abatement. It was an explicit policy decision aimed at achieving deregulation. Fewer 
than three audits would not be desirable, according to the respondents. All respondents 
were positive about the role of the auditors and felt that the CER can rely on the audits: 
‘The auditors are good, and they are audited as well. They are sometimes pushed to go 
into a certain direction, but they depend on their reputation. We do not see any 
scandals.’ According to the CER interviewees, irregularities were found, but not many. 
The CER does not believe that any fraudulent projects exist. Mostly, irregularities are 
caused by genuine mistakes. Non-compliance is expected to remain low: ‘We are seeing 
early delivery of abatement instead of non- or late abatement. That is a good sign.’ To 
date, no sanctions have been imposed. 
 
The CER, which is responsible for the whole process, from process registration through 
auctioning to monitoring and enforcement, is a relatively small organization. It is able to 
manage the entire process because as a process it is streamlined and mostly automated. 
For example, only a few days after an auction the CER is able to announce which 
projects have won a contract. It can do this because it only looks at price and abatement: 
the projects that have the most abatement against the lowest costs. The CER does not 
assess the overall quality of individual projects at the auctioning phase. 
 
4.3.5.2. Farmers’ Perspective 
 
Generally, respondents thought that the monitoring and reporting requirements in the 
various methodologies are too complex to be carried out by farmers themselves. As 
indicated above, the methodologies for piggeries are an exception because of the ease of 
electronic monitoring. As a consequence, audit costs are also much lower than in other 
sectors. By contrast, for example, in the methodology for soil carbon samples must be 
taken at multiple locations, at specified depths, at regular intervals, and by certified 
researchers. All respondents indicated that these more complex monitoring and 
reporting requirements are manageable, but that farmers need help from their carbon 
agents to comply with them. As a consequence, carbon agents work with their clients 
throughout the entire project. As one carbon agent put it: ‘We are in a long term 
relationship with our clients, as these contracts run for ten years. That is why the 
relationship gets very personal.’ 
 
In 2014, the Climate Change Authority argued that the administrative burden is difficult 
to reduce: agricultural emissions are difficult to regulate, and hence transaction costs for 
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this sector will remain unavoidably high.170 Complicated methods are needed to ensure 
that abatement is real and additional. High levels of local variability make it challenging 
to measure and verify emission reductions in natural systems. ‘These challenges are 
exacerbated where projects only achieve a small quantity of emission reductions, as 
transaction costs can become high on a per tonne CO2-e basis.’
171 
 
A respondent from a farmers’ organization acknowledged these findings: ‘the 
administrative burden is too big and too costly for a lot of people’. The respondent 
stressed the need to streamline the administration by using automated devices, tracking 
devices, digitized reporting, etc. This would make the process easier for farmers as well 
as for the government, as the authorities could then link project systems to their own 
automated reporting systems: ‘There still is a lot of work to do to streamline and 
digitalize back-end processes.’ 
 
Everyone interviewed stressed that the strict rules on registration, monitoring, reporting, 
and auditing are essential for the success of the scheme. These rules have led to a high 
degree of integrity and reliability.172 Carbon agents all acknowledged that the thorough 
and involved processes in the various stages (registration, monitoring and reporting, 
auditing) lead to high overhead costs for all those involved, including the government. 
This, however, is the price that needs to be paid to have a reliable scheme under which 
large amounts of public money are spent.  
 
4.3.6. Scope of the Projects: Aim of Methods 
 
4.3.6.1. Development of Methodology Determinations for the Agricultural Sector 
 
Methodology development was driven by demand and political preference. Respondents 
indicated that methane capture from piggeries was a method for which there was high 
sector demand. Savanna burning was an important methodology because politicians 
wanted to favour aboriginal communities (one-third of savanna burning is done by 
aboriginal groups on native title land). 
 
Respondents at the CER said that most projects under the ERF are run by farmers, albeit 
mostly in the vegetation category, with only a small percentage in the agriculture 
category. Since there are nine methodologies in the agriculture category, more 
agricultural (i.e., non-vegetation) projects had been expected to be taken up: ‘It is, 
however, the market that decides. We have the methods; it is up to the market to 
propose projects.’ The reason why piggeries score well in the agriculture category is 
that in biogas projects the additionality is relatively clear, reductions are easy to monitor 
and measure, and they generate good side-benefits (lower energy bills and additional 
revenue through delivery of surplus energy to the grid). Australia Pork’s respondent 
explained how they found a low-cost biogas technology in New Zealand, how they 
promoted the adoption of that technology by their members, and then promoted the 
adoption of a CFI-methodology around that technology by the government, so as to 
achieve a sector wide goal of emitting one kg CO2 per one kg of pork produced.  
 
170 Climate Change Authority, supra note 110, at 46. 
171 Ibid. 




It is generally thought, however, that there are numerous other agricultural activities for 
which methodologies could be developed. Several respondents indicated their concern 
that this is not happening at the moment due to a lack of initiative in the sector. A 
respondent from a large farmers’ organization indicated that most attention has been 
focused on the early methods that make commercial sense. More methods are needed in 
order to achieve a larger degree of participation of Australia’s farmers. Reducing 
methane emissions from cattle was mentioned as an example where there currently is 
only one methodology (piggeries), but where others, aimed at better feed conversion, 
are in the pipeline which are promising and that can be made available in the next three 
to five years, such as genetic selection and changing the gut bacteria in cattle.  
 
As already stated, most projects are in the category of vegetation. Vegetation projects 
generally are on farmland and are mostly proposed by a handful of aggregators. One of 
these aggregators estimated that of all savanna burning, vegetation-regeneration, 
revegetation, and soil-carbon projects, 300 to 400 (the vast majority of these projects) 
are on farmland. 
 
There are mixed thoughts about the innovative character of the various methodologies. 
According to several carbon agents and a climate change NGO, some methodologies are 
thought to be too conservative, aiming at introducing technologies that farmers should 
introduce anyway. This may be particularly true for methodologies that were proposed 
by the specific sector organization, rather than by the government or by carbon agents. 
There is also a timing issue: a new technology that was stimulated by the CFI, over time 
comes into common use. Biogas production in piggeries was mentioned both by carbon 
agents, a representative of a climate change NGO and by a former high official of the 
Australian government as an example: ‘Piggery farms make a lot of money by 
producing energy from methane, they do not need a government subsidy. Many 
piggeries have converted to this already simply because of economic reasons, not 
because of the ERF.’  
 
Other methodologies, however, are very new. All carbon agents interviewed 
considered these to be somewhat risky because, at the time of adoption of the 
methodology, it was not entirely clear how much abatement would be generated, or 
whether abatement would be generated at all when applying the methodology in a 
range of different local circumstances across Australia. One carbon agent estimated 
that perhaps twenty per cent of the projects do not generate the level of abatement 
that was expected when the methodology was adopted: ‘You can criticize this for not 
being perfect. But this was a good choice, because at least things could get started. 
While monitoring, we are learning.’ Several carbon agents mentioned soil carbon as 
a very promising methodology for the future that is being pushed by the ERF. They 
praise the government for having taken the risk of adopting a methodology of which 
the additionality had not been fully proven. They argue that innovation has been 
forced and that the continuous monitoring process leads to an improved methodology 
that is potentially valuable for the whole world. 
 




The CER respondents were very clear about the goal of the ERF: 
 
The ERF’s aim is to achieve abatement at the lowest cost, it is not a grant scheme aimed 
at technology investment support. We have other programmes for that. It was an explicit 
decision to get abatement at the lowest cost. The rest is collateral. Decisions are taken 
purely on price. In an auction, we do not even see the projects. We only see the price and 
the amount of abatement, so the nature of the projects does not play a role.  
 
Other respondents stressed that adaptation is essential for Australia’s farming sector, a 
vital element of any sustainable farming business. Several sequestration methodologies 
have strong positive adaptation side effects, as they increase the resilience of the land 
and lead to greater efficiency. Interviewees said that increasing soil carbon is a good 
example of how mitigation and adaptation go hand-in-hand. Many argued for the 
adoption of more methodologies that have co-benefits in the area of adaptation. They 
felt that adaptation should play a larger role under the ERF in the future, and that the 
ERF should not focus on mitigation alone (see, further, section 4.3.8). 
 
4.3.7. Results of CFI/ERF for the Environment and for the Individual Farmer 
 
In literature, the repeal of the Clean Energy Act and the transition from the CFI to the 
ERF has been criticized for a lack of ambition to achieve major cuts in GHG 
emissions.173 Yet this policy change did have a very positive impact on promoting 
carbon farming. Everyone interviewed considered the ERF a great success, at least for 
the agricultural sector. Abatement has been primarily achieved by vegetation projects. 
There is no evidence that these projects would have happened otherwise. The financial 
incentives offered by the CFI and ERF are considered to be largely responsible for the 
large abatement that has been achieved in this sector. Contrary to a recent report that 
argues that many ‘anyway’-projects are accepted under the ERF,174 i.e. projects that 
would have occurred anyway, I found no clear evidence of this in the interviews, 
perhaps with the exception of some (but not all) methane conversion projects in 
piggeries. As already mentioned, in the piggeries sector, some producers save 
AU$15,000 (roughly US$11,500) per month on energy bills, and earn an additional 
AU$15,000 for delivering energy to the grid after having adopted methane-capture and 
biogas-production technology. When asked whether the CFI/ERF or the expected 
economic co-benefit was the greatest attraction, the respondent from the pork sector 
said that the CFI/ERF was the main driver for the distribution of this technology: 
 
About half of the participating producers were pushed by the CFI/ERF. It especially 
pushes medium sized producers, because it increases their payback just enough to get 
involved.  
 
173 Climate Change Authority, supra note 9, at 8 and 10 (albeit rather implicitly); Marcia Rocha, Bill 
Hare, Paola Parra, Jasmin Cantzler, Niklas Höhne, Louise Jeffery, Ryan Alexander, Lindee Wong, 
Karlien Wouters and Kornelis Blok, Australia Set to Overshoot its 2030 Target by Large Margin 
(Climate Action Tracker, Climate Analytics, 2015) at 12. 
174 Paul J. Burke, ‘Undermined by Adverse Selection: Australia’s Direct Action Abatement Subsidies’ 
(Working Paper Series No. 1605, Centre for Climate Economics & Policy, Australian National 
University, 2016). This paper assumes, based on literature research, that by using an automated system 
when selecting projects under an ERF auction that only focuses on achieving the most abatement at the 




Some carbon agents, however, suggested that these large extra earnings in the piggeries 
sector take away the need for the government to finance the adoption of methane 
capture technologies through the ERF. It indeed seems that over time, continued support 
for mitigation technologies should be reviewed. Once regular market incentives become 
strong enough for farmers to adopt new technologies anyway, government funds can 
better be directed to stimulate the adoption of innovative technologies or practices that 
need an extra push. 
 
Continued support for methodologies also needs to be reviewed in the light of negative 
side effects on the environment. Several respondents, both from carbon agents and the 
agricultural sector, indicated that some methodologies, such as oil mallee plantings, 
have detrimental impacts on biodiversity. When such negative side effects are 
discovered, it seems appropriate for the government to end its support for that 
methodology under a carbon farming scheme. 
 
Generally, respondents heralded the generation of new knowledge for the farming 
sector through the ERF. They felt that several methodologies, such as soil-carbon 
methodologies, truly foster innovation. Thanks to the ERF, better farming methods are 
introduced in a generally conservative sector. These methods are not just good for 
combatting climate change, they have many benefits for farmers and even for food 
security. Vegetation projects generally reduce salination and erosion and improve water 
retention. Soil-carbon projects were described as having an astonishing impact on soil 
quality. One carbon agent maintained that every one-per-cent increase in the level of 
soil organic carbon leads to an increase of 14.4 litres of plant water availability per 
square metre in the top thirty centimetres of soil.175 Assessing the impact of soil-carbon 
projects, however, is complex, and carbon agents indicated that ‘we are still learning 
how to do it under different circumstances’. Since the ERF requires farmers to carefully 
monitor what is happening in the soil, more data will gradually become available on the 
impacts of the increase of soil carbon on the productivity of the soil.  
 
 
4.3.8. Future Production Increase and Additional Emission Cuts: What Role for 
CFI/ERF? 
 
4.3.8.1. Financing Carbon Farming: Private Carbon Market or Government Scheme?  
 
There is considerable debate about the future of Australia’s climate policy and the role 
of the CFI/ERF as part of that policy.176 The interviews were held only one month 
before the 2016 national elections. Most respondents mentioned as important the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement, which necessitates a more ambitious climate policy 
for Australia, and the expected dramatic increase in demand for food products from 
 
175 I could not find confirmation of these figures, but the literature does confirm that increasing soil 
carbon greatly improves plant water availability. See section 2, above, and the references in note 45. 
176 E.g., Gabrielle Chan, ‘Election 2016: Turnbull Tells Leaders' Debate He Will Meet Tough Climate 
Change Targets’, The Guardian, 29 May 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2016/may/29/election-2016-turnbull-tells-leaders-debate-he-will-meet-tough-climate-change-
targets> (last accessed on 29 August 2016).  
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Asia. These developments necessitate a much stronger focus of climate policy and law 
on the agricultural sector. 
 
Several respondents thought that an ETS is needed to generate more funds to invest in 
offsets in agriculture. Funding so many agricultural emission-reduction projects through 
government funds is unattainable, they thought. One respondent said: ‘We have to go 
back to the original scheme of the CFI embedded in a market-based cap-and-trade 
system.’ Another consultant stressed that setting a cap on emissions is urgently 
required: 
 
Otherwise it is a bucket with a hole. It is impossible to know whether emission cuts under 
the ERF are additional. You have to set a cap and then introduce mechanisms like these, 
so that you know that overall emissions will go down. We need complimentary policies 
therefore.  
 
Most carbon agents expected that the Australian government would commit to 
additional funding for the next few years, with the aim to fund between 2000 and 3000 
projects until 2025. All acknowledged that after that, additional measures are required, 
including setting a cap on agricultural emissions. One respondent from the agricultural 
business sector complained that increasing competition for diminishing ERF funds may 
squeeze out farming businesses. He indicated that some farmers already ask themselves 
‘what’s the point in applying?’ As far as the near future is concerned, however, the CER 
interviewees indicated that sufficient funds will be available: ‘At the moment [after the 
April 2016 auction], we have AU$800 million left. This is sufficient money for many 
more projects. Whether more money should go into the ERF is a hotly contested policy 
issue’. These respondents also stressed that projects also go ahead without government 
funding as ACCUs are still being sold on the regular carbon market. 
 
Several interviewees, both carbon agents and representatives from agricultural 
organisations, were critical of having an ETS finance carbon farming. They pointed at 
the current low carbon price and said that farmers need a reliable and stable source of 
income. A respondent from government and academia added that it is difficult to return 
to the ETS Australia used to have. This generic instrument was meant to achieve all 
climate policy goals at once without any additional policy instruments. Instead, a multi 
instrument scheme is needed that is specifically focused on farmers. 
 
The CER respondents referred to different views in the current public debate, that either 
argue for tighter safeguards that can partly be met by the use of tradable permits, 
including offsets from farmers,177 or for tightening the safeguards after 2020 with 
emission-intensity benchmarks, to create demand.178 
 
 
177 Tony Wood, ‘Road map Points Way to Stable Climate Policy’, Grattan Institute website (11 April 
2016), <https://grattan.edu.au/news/road-map-points-way-to-stable-climate-policy> (last accessed on 29 
August 2016). The Grattan Institute is an independent think tank on Australian public policy. 
178 Greg Hunt, ‘Safeguard Mechanism Will Support Emissions Reduction’, Media Release (6 April 2016), 
<https://www.environment.gov.au/minister/hunt/2016/mr20160406a.html> and 
<https://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/emissions-reduction-fund/about/safeguard-




4.3.8.2. Broadening the Scheme Beyond Mitigation? 
 
As stated earlier, most respondents felt that the scheme should not have a sole focus on 
mitigation, but should be extended to also focus on adaptation, landscape restoration, 
and biodiversity preservation. There were many opportunities, they said, to rehabilitate 
farmland. The ERF offers the possibility to integrate these factors. Currently, positive 
impacts in these areas through the operation of the ERF are unintended by the policy, 
yet important, co-benefits. A person from one of Australia’s major farmers’ 
organizations stressed the importance of having a balanced, integrated approach at farm 
level, namely several different types of measure at the farm that together form a good 
balance for mitigation, productivity, biodiversity conservation, etc. All interviewees 
seemed to agree that broadening the scheme should not reduce its integrity. 
 
4.3.8.3. What About Food Security? 
 
Carbon farming can have a beneficial impact on food production. Generally, 
respondents believed that a broader process towards sustainable agriculture is needed to 
be able to meet increasing demand under increasing climate change impacts. A 
respondent from a bank said: ‘We only support smart farmers who have a good product 
and who can handle the responsibility of continuous improvement for sustainability and 
food security.’ 
 
To reduce emissions while at the same time increasing production, the focus, according 
to the respondent of a farmers’ organization, should be on reducing the emission 
intensity of production. This is especially important for the cattle sector, as most of 
agricultural emissions in Australia are associated with this sector: ‘Reduce the 
emissions per beast. This is a critical part of the story. We need much more R&D to 
achieve a better feed conversion.’ This is in line with earlier findings of the Climate 
Change Authority that noted that it is likely that emissions from the agricultural sector 
will grow, even with a high carbon price in place.179 Although agricultural emissions 
can be reduced by improved manure management, feed supplement, feedlot finishing, 
and pasture improvements, the Climate Change Authority found that most of the 
technologies and practices that would achieve this are still in development and not ready 
for commercial use.180 
 
Most respondents thought the expected increase in food demand from the Asian market 
could in theory be met by the Australian farming sector. Some increase is possible 
through better practices on existing farms, but the vast majority of additional food must 
come from yet-to-be-developed agricultural areas. In the tropical north of Australia, 
especially, there are areas with good irrigation potential, such as the Pilbara Region. 
Development of this area is currently being discussed, as is evident from a 2015 White 
Paper.181 Through the new Northern Australia Infrastructure Facility Act 2016, the 
 
179 Climate Change Authority, supra note 108, at 54, and Climate Change Authority, supra note 9, at 303. 
180 Ibid.  
181 Australian Government, ‘Our North, Our Future: White Paper on Developing Northern Australia’ 
(Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2015) at 56: ‘The north could become an agricultural 
powerhouse — on par with Brazil’s Cerrado — and be recognised globally as a leading region in high 
quality food production. Reforms to land tenure and improved land surveys could open up a quarter of the 
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federal government offers up to AU$5 billion (US$3.8 billion) in concessional loans to 
encourage and complement private-sector investment in economic infrastructure in 
northern Australia, so that agribusiness can develop further there. Vital infrastructure is 
needed, such as port facilities. The big question, according one carbon agent, is whether 
environmental protection will keep up with the increase in production. A former 
government official was very critical of these developments in northern Australia and 
thought that it is an excuse to clear lands. He referred to the 2015 CSIRO National 
Outlook that argues that with a minimal carbon price, current agricultural lands will be 
more productive. 182 According to this respondent, increasing soil carbon is much more 
valuable than beef cattle land. The same respondent argued that we should focus on 
changing our diet: ‘Are we certain that Asians, as they get richer, want beef?’ He 
referred to the development of high-protein plant-based food products that are currently 
being developed and will become commercially available soon, especially in the 
Netherlands and the United States:183 
 
To produce these plant-based proteins, much less land is needed, and it gives you much 
of what is required by richer people who want protein-rich food. A diet change is needed 
to accommodate the increase in food demand and reduce emissions from agriculture. 
Agricultural countries like the Netherlands and Australia will remain agricultural 
countries, but can produce more with less resources. Farmers will have to grow different 
things. 
 
4.4. Conclusions From Empirical Research 
 
A wealth of information was found in the case studies and interviews. The following 
main conclusions can be drawn from the empirical research into Australia’s CFI: 
 
1. The regulatory framework laid down in the CFI Act and associated regulations is 
considered robust and ensures integrity. 
2. Consultants have been the main drivers of the scheme, with associated costs for 
farmers. Sector organizations play an important role in persuading individual 
farmers to engage in carbon-farming projects. 
3. The monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) processes are usually run by 
consultants because of their complexity, which is costly for farmers. Only where 
automated/digitized systems exist can farmers manage MRV themselves. 
Research into and development of such automated monitoring and reporting 
systems across methodologies is needed. 
 
north’s land area — equivalent to half the size of New South Wales — for new development 
opportunities.’ 
182 CSIRO, Australian National Outlook 2015: Living Standards, Resource Use, Environmental 
Performance and Economic Activity, 1970-2050 (Canberra, Australia: CSIRO, 2015), at iii. The report 
concludes: ‘At payments for carbon farming around A$40-60 per tonne of CO2e by 2030, carbon credits 
could be harnessed to reward landowners for restoring ecosystems, increasing native habitat by 17% and 
decreasing extinction risks by 10%, without large additional government outlays.’ 
183 A range of start-up companies is developing meat-like products from plants, for an overview, see 
Anonymous, ‘Silicon Valley Gets a Taste for Food’, The Economist, 7 March 2015,  
<http://www.economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21645497-tech-startups-are-moving-food-
business-make-sustainable-versions-meat> (last accessed on 29 August 2016). 
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4. There seems to be a high level of compliance, although checking for compliance, 
so far, is mainly done on the basis of audit reports.184 
5. Although a wide range of carbon-farming methodologies has been adopted, only 
a few are applied in the farming sector. This is primarily caused by the focus of 
the scheme on achieving the largest possible amount of abatement against the 
lowest costs; to a lesser degree, it is due to lack of interest by certain influential 
agribusiness organizations. 
6. The level of ambition differs for the various methodologies: some are considered 
to be too similar to what farmers are expected to do anyway because the market 
already offers large economic incentives, while others are considered to promote 
innovation.  
7. Those methodologies that have important co-benefits for farmers, for food 
security as well as for the broader environment, are heralded as important 
instruments for change. Focus should be on adopting methodologies that have 
such co-benefits and do not focus on mitigation alone. A considerable research 
and development effort is needed before reliable methodologies that foster 
innovation in all agricultural sectors is achieved. 
8. The switch from a purely market-based mechanism, to a mechanism under which 
the government buys up credits against a fixed price under a long-term contract 
drafted before abatement is actually achieved has given an enormous boost to the 
adoption of carbon-farming practices in Australia. 
9. To engage the large majority of smaller farms as well, it is necessary to adopt a 
‘whole of farm’ approach that allows farmers to adopt a set of different measures 
under different methodologies without the need to divide these activities into 
separate ERF projects with all the associated administration and costs. 
10. The expected large increase in global food demand will lead to higher emissions 
that are difficult to reduce with schemes like the ERF alone. In the long run, a 
dietary change away from meat products is suggested as the ultimate way to 
drastically reduce emissions from agriculture. 
 
5. Conclusion: Lessons for Regulatory Design Aimed at Reducing Emissions From 
Agriculture 
 
This article has reviewed the experience with Australia’s carbon-farming legislation, 
with the objective to articulate lessons for regulatory design aimed at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture. Both the desk study and the empirical 
research presented above lead to the conclusion that the Carbon Credits (CFI) Act 2011 
provides an elaborate legal framework that seems well suited to assess project 
applications and issue credits to participating farmers who, through these projects, 
generate real and additional emission reductions. The 2015 amendments leading to the 
creation of the ERF increased participation by farmers by reducing uncertainty about 
the revenue to be generated through the projects. The experiences in Australia form a 
reliable basis for recommendations to policymakers and regulators around the world 
who wish to develop a regulatory framework aimed at stimulating farmers to convert to 
 
184 Recent research shows that this is risky and that enforcement agencies should also develop their own 
inspection policy and do, for instance, site visits, Jonathan Verschuuren and Floor Fleurke, ‘Enforcement 
of the EU ETS in the Member States’, 1-2 ELNI Review (2015) 17-23. 
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farming practices that reduce greenhouse gas emissions or even to broaden climate-
smart practices. The following lessons may be drawn. 
 
The first and possibly most important lesson is not a purely legal one. A policy aimed at 
stimulating carbon farming has to be reliable and provide certainty for at least ten to 
twenty years. Farmers who want to introduce carbon farming have to implement 
structural changes to their farming practices with long-term impacts on their business. 
The policy environment, as well as the financial environment of agribusiness, have to 
accommodate such long-term impacts. This implies that relying on the carbon market 
for funding should only be done when there is long-term certainty that carbon credits 
will earn an acceptable minimum price. 
 
The next lesson also concerns the broader policy background. A policy that has a wider 
focus on adaptation, food security, resilient and sustainable farm businesses, and 
securing and creating jobs in the agribusiness sector is likely to be more successful than 
one that only focuses on reducing emissions from agriculture. Several of the methods 
accepted or under development in Australia, such as those dealing with soil carbon, 
show that such co-benefits can indeed be achieved. 
 
Developing climate-smart methodologies that not only deliver real, additional, 
measurable, and verifiable emission reductions but also foster long-term innovation and 
create economic, social, and environmental co-benefits is essential for the success of 
any policy aimed at stimulating climate-smart agriculture. Science has to be central in 
the development and adoption of methods that are accepted under the regulatory 
framework. In Australia, much research effort has already gone into method 
development. International collaboration in method development is important for 
efficiency reasons. When developing methodologies, special attention must be paid to 
small farms. 
 
Regulation should focus on projects and should not set uniform rules or simply require 
farmers to hand in allowances under an ETS. Given the fact that potentially large 
numbers of farmers should be able to participate, much attention has to be focused on 
developing automated systems for all phases of the process: from project application to 
monitoring, reporting, and verification. Project development according to accepted 
methods needs to be guided by experts. Agribusiness organizations have a role to play 
here, but most work will be done by the private (consultancy) sector. 
 
Having a robust and reliable MRV system in place is, as with the ETS, essential. The 
regulatory framework will have to comprise detailed legal rules on MRV. By contrast 
with most sectors, in agriculture, MRV is very site-specific and can be labour-intensive, 
especially in the case of carbon sequestration. Again, private consultancy businesses 
will have to play a major role here. Research is needed to develop reliable and less 
labour-intensive methods to assess the amount of emission reductions achieved or 
carbon sequestered. 
 
Despite its fairly poor overall climate change policy, Australia has shown that it is 
possible to regulate for the reduction of emissions from agriculture and for increased 
sequestration in agricultural soil and vegetation on agricultural lands. In order to 
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achieve the Paris Agreement objectives, the rest of the world has to start developing 
policies and laws fast to unlock the potential of the agricultural sector, so that climate-
smart agricultural practices are commonplace before production levels increase 
following the expected dramatic increase in demand for food products. 
